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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum
dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics
and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both
dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)
as well as a quadratic regression (weighted covariance matrix)
of the states and actions, where the linear regression of states is
called deep state. We study collaborative and non-collaborative
games under three information structures: perfect sharing, deep
state sharing, and no sharing for three different types of weights:
positive, homogeneous and asymptotically vanishing weights. For
perfect and deep state sharing information structures, we propose
a transformation-based technique to solve for the best-response
equations of players and identify a few sufficient conditions
under which a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
The equilibrium is linear in the local state and deep state,
and the corresponding gains are obtained by solving a novel
non-standard Riccati equation (whose dimension is independent
of the number of players, thus making the solution scalable).
When the information structure is no-sharing and the number
of players is asymptotically large, one approximate population-
size-dependent equilibrium and one approximate population-size-
independent equilibrium (also called sequential weighted mean-
field equilibrium) are proposed, and their convergence to the
infinite-population limits are established. In addition, the main
results are extended to infinite-horizon cost function, and general-
ized to multiple orthogonal linear regressions and heterogeneous
sub-populations. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate
the difference between the two proposed approximate equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to propose
a unified framework to obtain the exact solution in closed form
for an arbitrary number of players with homogeneous weights.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of nonzero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games
can be traced back to work of Case [1] and Starr and Ho [2],
[3] over five decades ago. Early results demonstrated that
finding the Nash solution with perfect information structure
can be much more difficult than solving the LQ optimal control
problem. For instance, a two-player game with strictly convex
cost functions may be not playable (i.e., the game may not
admit a solution) [4]; may admit uncountably many solutions
(where each solution leads to a different set of pay-offs) [5];
may admit a unique Nash solution in a stochastic game but
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admit infinitely many solutions in its deterministic form [5],
or may have a unique Nash solution for an arbitrary finite
horizon but have no solution, a unique solution, or infinitely
many solutions in the infinite horizon [6]. For a stochastic
LQ game, it is well known that the necessary and sufficient
condition for the Nash solution to exist uniquely is equivalent
to the existence and uniqueness condition for the solution of
a particular set of coupled Riccati equations [5]. For a deter-
ministic LQ game, however, it is more difficult to establish
an existence condition for a unique Nash solution because the
above-mentioned coupled Riccati equations do not necessarily
identify all the possible Nash solutions. The interested reader
is referred to [7], [8] for some counterexamples where the
coupled Riccati equations do not have a solution but the
deterministic game admits one, and to [5] for a counterexample
where the coupled Riccati equations have a unique solution but
the deterministic game admits uncountably many solutions.
In addition, as the number of players increases, the curse
of dimensionality exacerbates the above challenges from a
computational viewpoint. On the other hand, due to limited
communication resources in practice, it may not be feasible to
implement the perfect information structure, especially when
the number of players is large. In such a case, one may need
to consider “imperfect” structures with players having private
information, making it conceptually difficult for players to
reach an agreement. Finding the Nash solution in LQ games
under imperfect information structure involves non-convex
optimization, which in general destroys the linearity of the
solution. For instance, it is shown in [9] via a counterexample
that nonlinear strategies can outperform linear strategies. As
a result, it has been a long-standing challenge in game theory
to identify games that possess tractable solutions irrespective
of the number of players. The reader is referred to [10]–[12]
for more details on the theory and application of LQ games.
Due to difficulties outlined in the previous paragraph and
inspired by recent developments in deep structured teams [13],
[14], we consider a class of LQ deep structured games wherein
the interaction between players is modelled by a set of linear
regressions (weighted averages) of the states and actions of
players. These models are called deep structured because of
the fact that the interaction between the players is similar to
that of the neurons of a deep feed-forward neural network. In
this paper, we focus on three classes of weights: homogeneous
weights, asymptotically vanishing (negligible) weights, and
positive weights with social cost function. To this end, we
consider three information structures: perfect sharing, deep
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state sharing and no sharing, where deep state refers to the
linear regression of the states. In perfect sharing information
structure, every player has access to the joint state vector;
in the deep state sharing, every player has only access to its
local state and the deep state, and in the no-sharing structure,
every player has only access to its local state. Under perfect
and deep state sharing information structures, we introduce
a transformation-based technique to identify a few sufficient
conditions for the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in terms of a novel scalable non-standard Riccati
equation. In addition, we propose two approximate sequential
equilibria for the no-sharing information structure that are both
sequential asymptotic reciprocal and Nash equilibria under
mild assumptions, and converge to the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium as the number of players goes to infinity.
The closest field of research to LQ deep structured games is
LQ mean-field games, which is a special class of exchangeable
games with homogeneous weights and asymptotically large
number of players [15]–[18]. In the simplest formulation of
LQ mean-field games, the players are coupled in the dynamics
and cost through the empirical mean of states (i.e., deep state
with homogeneous weights) with a tracking cost formulation.
When the number of players goes to infinity, the effect of a
single player on other players is negligible; hence, the infinite-
population game reduces to a constrained optimal control
problem where: (a) a generic player computes its best-response
strategy by solving an optimal tracking problem described by
a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with respect
to some hypothesized reference trajectory, and (b) for the
reference trajectory to be admissible, it is constrained to be
equal to the mean-field (deep state of the infinite-population
game with homogeneous weights) whose dynamics is ex-
pressed by a forward advection or Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov
equation. This is a fixed-point requirement, and sufficient
conditions can be imposed to guarantee the existence of a
unique solution [16]. The resultant equilibrium is called mean-
field equilibrium, which is not generally a sequential equilib-
rium, and its extension to non-negligible components, e.g.,
major-minor and common-noise is conceptually challenging
because the mean-field trajectory becomes unpredictable. On
the other hand, when players use identical state feedback
strategies and share the same cost function, the mean-field
converges to the expectation of the generic player’s state due
to the strong law of large numbers. This converts the above
two-body optimization problem into a one-body optimization
problem of McKean-Vlasov type, where the expectation of the
state appears in the dynamics and cost function. The resultant
problem is known as the LQ mean-field-type game problem.
The solution of this problem is obtained by forward-backward
equations in [19] and by backward equations (Riccati equa-
tions) in [20], [21]. In contrast to the above results that are
only relevant when the number of players is large, the authors
in [22], [23] consider a finite-population LQ mean-field game
wherein players are decoupled in dynamics. When attention
is restricted to Gaussian random variables with identical
and affine stationary feedback strategies, the finite-population
game reduces to a constrained optimal control problem where
the existence of a Nash solution is conditioned on the solution
of a coupled algebraic Riccati-Sylvester equation.1 For more
details on the theory and applications of mean-field coupled
models, the reader is referred to [24] and references therein.
In contrast to LQ mean-field games and mean-field-type
games, we consider a more general formulation that encom-
passes mean-field games and mean-field-type games models,
simultaneously, consisting of arbitrary finite number of play-
ers (that does not necessarily reduce to an optimal control
problem). In particular, we present an explicit formulation
for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in terms of a
novel non-standard Riccati equation, by introducing a gauge
transformation technique, for any arbitrary number of play-
ers (not necessarily large) with possibly correlated noises
(not necessarily independent) and population-size-dependent
(not necessarily population-size-independent) models. Further-
more, when the number of players is sufficiently large, we
compute the infinite-population solution for any arbitrary
vanishing weights (not necessarily homogeneous weights). For
no-sharing information structure, we consider two approximate
solution concepts, called sequential asymptotic reciprocal and
Nash equilibria, and propose one population-size-dependent
and one population-size-independent equilibria, where the
former often outperforms the latter. For a more detailed
comparison with mean-field models, the reader is referred to
Section VI. It is to be noted that our framework is different
from the one in [22], [23] because we provide a stronger
result albeit under a richer information structure. In particular,
we consider the case in which players are coupled in both
dynamics and cost, and random variables are not necessarily
Gaussian. Without restricting attention to any particular class
of strategies or infinite-horizon cost function, we show that
the Nash equilibrium is identical across players and is linear
in the local state and deep state.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, the problem is formulated and the main contributions
of the paper are outlined. In Section III, the subgame perfect
Nash solution under perfect and deep state sharing information
structures is identified, and in Section IV, two approximate
sequential equilibria under no-sharing information structure
are proposed. The main results are extended to infinite-horizon
cost function in Section V, and a detailed comparison with
mean-field models is presented in Section VI. In Section VII,
a brief discussion on possible generalizations of the presented
results is provided and in Section VIII, a numerical example is
given to validate the theoretical findings. Finally in Section IX,
the main results are summarized and conclusions are drawn.
Notation
Throughout this paper, N and R denote natural and real
numbers, respectively. For any n ∈ N, the short-hand notations
x1:n and Nn are used to denote the vector (x1, . . . , xn) and
the set {1, . . . , n}, respectively. For any vectors x, y, and
z, vec(x, y, z) represents the vector [xᵀ, yᵀ, zᵀ]ᵀ. Given any
1Note that the above mean-field models are continuous-time while our
model is in discrete-time. However, it is straightforward to translate the results
from continuous time to discrete time and vice versa, specially for LQ models
that are well studied in both setups.
square matrices A, B, and C, diag(A,B,C) is the block
diagonal matrix with matrices A, B and C on its main
diagonal. Let A be an n× n block matrix; then Ai,j refers to
the block matrix located at the i-th row and the j-th column,
i, j ∈ Nn. For any n,m ∈ N, 1n×m denotes an n-by-m matrix
whose arrays are one. Given a set x = {x1, . . . , xn}, x−i is
the set without its i-th component, i ∈ Nn. Tr(·) is the trace
of a matrix, AC(·) is the auto-covariance matrix of a random
vector, E[·] is the expectation of an event, and ≺ () is the
element-wise inequality.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a stochastic dynamic game with n ∈ N players
that have linear dynamics with quadratic cost functions. In
order to have a meaningful game, the number of players n
is assumed to be greater than 1 in the sequel. Let xit ∈ Rdx ,
uit ∈ Rdu and wit ∈ Rdx , dx, du ∈ N, denote the local state,
the local action and the local noise of player i ∈ Nn at time
t ∈ NT , where T ∈ N denotes the game horizon. Denote
by xt = vec(x1t , . . . , x
n
t ), ut = vec(u
1
t , . . . , u
n
t ) and wt =
vec(w1t , . . . , w
n
t ) the stacked state, the stacked action, and the
stacked noise at time t ∈ NT , respectively. Let αin ∈ R denote
the influence factor (weight) of player i among its peers, where
interactions between players are modelled by the following
linear regressions (weighted averages):
x¯t :=
n∑
i=1
αinx
i
t, u¯t :=
n∑
i=1
αinu
i
t. (1)
For ease of reference and inspired by recent developments
in deep structured models [13], [14], we refer to the above
linear regressions as deep state and deep action in the sequel.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the weights are
normalized as follows:
∑n
i=1 α
i
n = 1.
The dynamics of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT is coupled
to other players as follows:
xit+1 = Atx
i
t +Btu
i
t + A¯tx¯t + B¯tu¯t + w
i
t, (2)
where At, Bt, A¯t and B¯t are time-varying matrices of appro-
priate dimensions, and wit is a zero-mean local noise process.
Let the auto-covariance matrices of the initial states and local
noises be uniformly bounded in t and n, i.e., there exist
constant matrices Cx and Cw (that do not depend on t and n)
such that AC(x1)  Cx and AC(wt)  Cw, t ∈ NT , n ∈ Nn.
Note that the boundedness of the auto-covariance matrices
is a realistic assumption in practice. The random variables
(x1,w1, . . . ,wT ) are defined on a common probability space
and are mutually independent.
The per-step cost of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT is a
function of its local state and action as well as the empirical
weighted mean and covariance matrix of the states and actions
of all players as follows:
cit(xt,ut) = (x
i
t)
ᵀQtxit + 2(x
i
t)
ᵀSxt x¯t + (x¯t)
ᵀQ¯tx¯t
+ (uit)
ᵀRtuit + 2(u
i
t)
ᵀSut u¯t + (u¯t)
ᵀR¯tu¯t
+
n∑
j=1
αjn
(
(xjt )
ᵀGxt x
j
t +
n∑
j=1
(ujt )
ᵀGut u
j
t
)
, (3)
where matrices Qt, Rt, Sxt , S
u
t , Q¯t, R¯t, G
x
t and G
u
t are sym-
metric with appropriate dimensions. It is also possible to
consider cross terms between the states and actions in (3);
however, since such an extension is straightforward, it is not
considered here for simplicity of presentation.
Remark 1. The dimensions of the matrices defined above are
independent of the number of players n; however, their values
can be population-size-dependent, e.g. A¯t = n2Idx×dx . In
addition, the initial states and driving noises can be arbitrarily
correlated across players (not necessarily independent).
Below, we define three types of weights.
Definition 1. The weights may belong to the following types.
• Positive weights. This is when αin > 0,∀i ∈ Nn.
• Homogeneous weights. This is when the weights are
positive and equal, i.e. αin = 1/n,∀i ∈ Nn.
• Asymptotically vanishing weights. This is when there
exists a sufficiently large n0 ∈ N such that for every
n0 < n, αin = γ
i/n, γi ∈ [−γmax, γmax], γmax > 0.
Let An := {αin,∀i ∈ Nn} denote the set of all feasible
weights. It is observed that for homogeneous weights, An =
{ 1n} is a singleton, irrespective of the number of players n. In
addition, if all weights are asymptotically vanishing weights
(including homogeneous weights), A∞ = {0} is a singleton,
irrespective of γi, i ∈ N. In this paper, we mainly focus on the
homogeneous and asymptotically vanishing weights, except
the common cost that allows for arbitrary positive weights.
For the infinite-population limit, the following standard
assumption will be imposed on the model accordingly.
Assumption 1 (Population-size-independent model). All ma-
trices in the dynamics (2) and per-step cost function (3) are
independent of the number of players n.
Remark 2. The main results of this paper pertained to
the asymptotically vanishing weights hold only for a suf-
ficiently large population with population-size-independent
model. However, those of homogeneous and positive weights
hold for arbitrary number of players (not necessarily large)
with possibly population-size-dependent models.
For simplicity of analysis, we restrict attention to a single
linear regression of states and a single population in this arti-
cle. However, main results can naturally be extended to a setup
with multiple orthogonal linear regressions and heterogeneous
sub-populations, where the interaction between the players is
modelled by a set of deep states and deep actions. See [13]
for an analogous model and Section VII for a brief discussion.
A. Exchangeable players
In this section, it is shown that any LQ game with ex-
changeable players is equivalent to an LQ deep structured
game, where all players are equally important, i.e., they have
homogeneous weights αin = 1/n, ∀i ∈ Nn. To this end, we
consider a general LQ game in the following augmented form:
xt+1 = Atxt + Btut + wt, (4)
ct(xt,ut) = vec(c
1
t (xt,ut), . . . , c
n
t (xt,ut)), (5)
where the per-step cost function of player i is given by:
cit(xt,ut) = xt
ᵀQitxt + ut
ᵀRitut.
Definition 2 (Exchangeable players). The players are called
exchangeable if their dynamics and cost functions are invari-
ant to the way the players are indexed. In particular, for every
pair i, j ∈ Nn, the following holds:
• σi,j(xt+1) = At(σi,j(xt)) + Bt(σi,j(ut)) + σi,j(wt),
• σi,j(ct(xt,ut)) = ct(σi,j(xt), σi,j(ut)),
where σi,j swaps i-th and j-th components.
Proposition 1. Let the dynamics (4) and cost functions (5)
be exchangeable. There exist matrices (At, Bt, A¯t, B¯t) such
that the dynamics of player i ∈ Nn can be expressed by (2),
where αin = 1/n, ∀i ∈ Nn. In addition, there exist matrices
Qt, Rt, S
x
t , S
u
t , Q¯t, R¯t, G
x
t and G
u
t such that the cost function
of player i can be written as (3), where αin = 1/n, ∀i ∈ Nn.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 holds irrespective of the information structure
of players. It is worth highlighting that any exchangeable
function with Lipschitz bounds can be equivalently expressed
as a function of empirical distribution [25]. For more details
on exchangeable functions, see [26, Chapter 2].
Remark 3 (Mean-field models). It is to be noted that cost
function (3) is the most general representation of a generic
LQ game with exchangeable players, where weights are ho-
mogeneous. This generalization leads to a unified framework
for numerous cases of exchangeable models such as mean-
field games and mean-field-type games, which have been
studied separately within the context of LQ games. Also, we
are particularly interested in the so-called extended mean-
field games [27], where the effect of the aggregate action is
accounted for (this type of games has applications in financial
models). Importantly, we strive to give an exact and explicit
but scalable version of the solution to the finite-population
version of these games. In addition, the covariance term in (3)
is of particular interest in applications such as robust and
quantile sensitive games, where high variance is not desirable.
B. Information structure
In this paper, we consider three information structures. The
first one is called Perfect Sharing (PS), where every player has
access to the stacked state, i.e., the control action of player
i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT is given by:
uit = g
i
t(x1:t), (PS)
where git : R
ntdx → Rdu is a measurable function adapted
to the σ-algebra generated by {x1,w1, . . . ,wt}. The second
information structure is called Deep State Sharing (DSS), and
requires that every player observes its local state as well as
the deep state, i.e., the control action of player i ∈ Nn at time
t ∈ NT is described by:
uit = g
i
t(x
i
1:t, x¯1:t), (DSS)
where git : R
2tdx → Rdu is a measurable function adapted
to the σ-algebra generated by {xi1, x¯1, wi1, w¯1, . . . , wiT , w¯T }.
Layer t Layer t + 1
...
...
...
...
x1t
u1t
xit
uit
xnt
unt
x1t+1 = ft(x
1
t , u
1
t , x¯t, u¯t, w
1
t ),
u1t+1 = g
1
t+1(I
1
t+1),
xit+1 = ft(x
i
t, u
i
t, x¯t, u¯t, w
i
t),
uit+1 = g
i
t+1(I
i
t+1),
xnt+1 = ft(x
n
t , u
n
t , x¯t, u¯t, w
n
t ),
unt+1 = g
n
t+1(I
n
t+1).
Fig. 1. The coupling between the players in a deep structured model is similar
to that between the neurons of a deep feed-forward neural network. In this
paper, function ft is a multivariate affine function.
Layer t Layer t + 1
...
...
...
...
Weighted mean-field trajectory mx1:T and m
u
1:T
x1t
u1t
xit
uit
xnt
unt
x1t+1 = ft(x
1
t , u
1
t ,m
x
t ,m
u
t , w
1
t ),
u1t+1 = g
1
t+1(x
1
t+1),
xit+1 = ft(x
i
t, u
i
t,m
x
t ,m
u
t , w
i
t),
uit+1 = g
i
t+1(x
i
t+1),
xnt+1 = ft(x
n
t , u
n
t ,m
x
t ,m
u
t , w
n
t ),
unt+1 = g
n
t+1(x
n
t+1).
Fig. 2. Due to the asymptotically vanishing effect of individuals, one can
express the infinite-population game as a two-player game between a generic
player and an infinite-population player. When local noises are independent,
the dynamics of the deep state (i.e., the state of the infinite-population player)
becomes deterministic; hence, the deep state reduces to an external predictable
trajectory called (weighted) mean-field.
In practice, there are various applications in which DSS is
plausible. For example, it is a common practice in the stock
markets to provide players (e.g., buyers, sellers and brokers)
with statistical data on the total amount of shares, trades and
exchanges It is also possible to communicate the deep state,
without a central authority, by means of consensus algorithms.
The third information structure is called No Sharing (NS),
where each player knows nothing more than its local state:
uit = g
i
t(x
i
1:t), (NS)
where git : R
tdx → Rdu is a measurable function adapted to the
σ-algebra generated by {xi1, wi1, . . . , wiT }. When the number
of players is very large and sharing the deep state is infeasible,
NS information structure is more practical as it requires no
communication among players, except at the beginning of the
control horizon. In general, DSS and NS information structures
are appropriate for cloud-based and cyber-security applications
wherein players are concerned with sharing their private states.
The admissible set of control actions is assumed to be square
summable, i.e., given any γ ∈ (0, 1), E[∑Tt=1(uit)ᵀuit] < ∞
and E[limT→∞(1− γ)
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1(uit)
ᵀuit] <∞, ∀i ∈ Nn. In
the sequel, we refer to gin := g
i
1:T as the strategy of player
i ∈ Nn and to gn := {g11:T , . . . , gn1:T } as the strategy of the
game. In addition, we denote by Gi the set of strategies of
player i ∈ Nn, and by GPS, GDSS and GNS the set of PS, DSS
and NS strategies, respectively.
C. Solution concepts
Define the following cost-to-go function for player i ∈ Nn:
J in(g
i
n,g
−i
n )t0 := E
gn
[ T∑
t=t0
cit(xt,ut)
]
, t0 ∈ NT , (6)
where the above expectation is taken with respect to the
probability measures induced by the choice of strategy gn. For
PS information structure, we consider a standard sequential
solution concept introduced in [28] as follows.
Definition 3 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)).
Any strategy g∗n with perfect sharing information structure is
said to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if for any player
i ∈ Nn at any stage of the game t0 ∈ NT :
J in(g
∗,i
n ,g
∗,−i
n )t0 ≤ J in(gi,g∗,−in )t0 , ∀gi ∈ GPS.
For no-sharing information structure, we present two ap-
proximate solution concepts. The first one is motivated from
the role of reciprocation in game theory and introduced in [29].
Definition 4 (Sequential Asymptotic Reciprocal Equilibrium
(SARE)). Any strategy gˆ with imperfect information structure
is said to be a sequential asymptotic reciprocal equilibrium
if at any stage of the game t0 ∈ NT , the performance loss
of every player i ∈ Nn compared to that of the SPNE is less
than a threshold εt0(n) ≥ 0, where limn→∞ εt0(n) = 0. In
particular, there exists n0 ∈ N such that
|J in(gˆi, gˆ−i)t0 − J in(gi,∗n ,g∗,−in )t0 | ≤ εt0(n), n0 ≤ ∀n.
The second one is defined based on the notion of individual
rationality and ε-Nash equilibrium in game theory.
Definition 5 (Sequential Asymptotic Nash Equilibrium
(SANE)). Any strategy gˆ with imperfect information structure
is said to be a sequential asymptotic Nash equilibrium if the
benefit of every player i ∈ Nn from any unilateral deviation
at any stage of the game t0 ∈ NT does not exceed a threshold
ε¯t0(n), where limn→∞ ε¯t0(n) = 0. In particular, there exists
n0 ∈ N such that for any gi ∈ Gi:
J in(gˆ
i, gˆ−i)t0 ≤ J in(gi, gˆ−i)t0 + ε¯t0(n), n0 ≤ ∀n.
In general, SARE and SANE are conceptually two different
solution concepts, and they are not unique even if the SPNE
is unique. In particular, the existence of SARE implies the
existence of the finite-population SPNE solution g∗n while the
existence of SANE is independent of the finite-population
solution. This independence comes at a price that SANE
does not provide much insight about the finite-population (but
large) SPNE solution, which can generally lead to counter-
intuitive cases wherein the infinite-population equilibrium is
SANE but it is not the limit of the finite-population solution.
In this paper, we introduce two NS approximate strategies
that are both SARE and SANE under mild assumptions.
The first one is called sequential asymptotic population-size-
dependent equilibrium (SAPDE) and the second one is called
sequential weighted mean-field equilibrium (SWMFE). Note
that SWMFE is different from FBMFE (forward-backward
mean-field equilibrium), in general. For more information on
the relations between SARE, SANE, FBMFE, and SWMFE,
the reader is referred to [29].
We now formulate the following three problems.
Problem 1. If it exists, find a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium under perfect sharing information structure.
Problem 2. If it exists, find a sequential Nash strategy g∗n
under deep state sharing information structure such that for
any player i ∈ Nn at any stage of the game t0 ∈ NT :
J in(g
∗,i
n ,g
∗,−i
n )t0 ≤ J in(gi,g∗,−in )t0 , ∀gi ∈ GPS.
Problem 3. If they exist, find sequential asymptotic reciprocal
and sequential asymptotic Nash equilibria under no-sharing
information structure.
D. Main challenges and contributions
To solve Problem 1, one may use a formulation based on the
standard backward induction, leading to an investigation of the
solution of n coupled matrix Riccati equations [10], which is a
difficult task in general. In addition, if a solution exists, its nu-
merical computation suffers from the curse of dimensionality,
as matrices in Problem 1 are fully dense. To solve Problem 2
for a finite number of players, neither standard nor LQ mean-
field games [16] can be directly employed. This is because the
former generally requires some additional information which
is normally not available, while the latter becomes a viable
alternative only for a sufficiently large number of players.
To solve Problem 3, on the other hand, one can use an LQ
mean-field game approach [16] but because of the considered
objective functions, the problem is not necessarily reducible
to the classical mean-field game with a tracking cost function,
in particular because of empirical actions in the cost function
of players. In addition, similarly to [15], [16], the mean-field
game approach tends to overshadow the role of the number
of players in the solution by sending directly the number
of players to infinity and then evaluating the quality of the
approximation.
The main contributions of this paper are outlined below.
1) We propose a systematic approach to solve LQ games
with an arbitrary number of exchangeable players by
introducing a gauge transformation. More precisely, we
identify a few sufficient conditions for the existence of
a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for Prob-
lems 1 and 2, where the effect of an individual player
on others is not necessarily negligible. In addition, we
obtain the equilibrium in an explicit scalable form, in
particular, one where the complexity of calculations is
independent of the number of players (Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1). The above-mentioned condition along with
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is described by
a novel non-standard Riccati equation. Also, the main
results are generalized to weighted averages to better
distinguish the differences between exchangeable games,
infinite-population games and collaborative games.
2) We define performance and rationality gaps, and propose
two no-sharing approximate strategies for Problem 3 in
Theorems 3 and 4; see Remark 9 and the numerical
example presented in Section VIII for more details on
the differences between the two strategies.
3) We extend our main results to the discounted infinite-
horizon case (Theorems 6–8).
4) We study two special games wherein the proposed
non-standard Riccati equation reduces to two standard
Riccati equations. In addition, we shed some light on the
non-uniqueness feature of the solution in deterministic
models as well as in infinite-population games, and
present a unified framework to study similarities and
differences between diverse formulations of mean-field
games. For example, we show that the Nash and team-
optimal solutions coincide under PS and DSS structures.
Note that the Nash and team-optimal solutions are
not necessarily the same in LQ games with identical
cost functions, where local convexity (Nash solution) is
different from global convexity (team-optimal solution).
5) To illustrate the effect of the number of players on
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we present two
counterexamples wherein the finite-population game ad-
mits a unique solution while the infinite-population
game has no solution, and vice versa. For the special
case of a social cost function, however, we prove that
under PS and DSS information structures, the solution
is insensitive to the individual weights of players. In this
case, the two proposed no-sharing approximate strategies
are identical and independent of the number of players.
6) We briefly discuss a few generalizations of the pro-
posed non-standard Riccati equation in Section VII,
including multiple orthogonal linear regressions and sub-
populations, which is applicable to non-trivial cases such
as major-minor and common-noise problems with the
advantage that no additional complication arises.
For ease of reference, a summary of assumptions used in
this paper is outlined in Table I.
III. MAIN RESULTS FOR PROBLEMS 1 AND 2
In this section, we present solutions for Problems 1 and 2.
A. Gauge transformation and non-standard Riccati equation
Our analysis crucially hinges on a change of variables
whereby we replace players’ states, actions and noises by
a combination of deviations from the weighted averages of
state, action and noise, along with the weighted quantities
themselves. Define the following variables for any player
i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT :
∆xit := x
i
t − x¯t, ∆uit := uit − u¯t, ∆wit := wit − w¯t, (7)
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THIS PAPER.
Finite horizon conditions
A 1. Population-size-independent model
A 2. Sufficient condition for a unique solution with homogeneous weights
A 3. Sufficient condition for a unique solution in infinite-population model
A 4. Sufficient condition for a unique solution in infinite-population model
with decoupled standard Riccati equations
A 5. Sufficient condition for a unique solution of social cost function
with positive weights and decoupled standard Riccati equations
A 6. Independent random variables for NS information structure
A 7. Existence of finite-population solution with asymp. vanishing weights
A 8. Sufficient condition for asymptotic convergence of rationality gaps
Additional conditions in infinite horizon
A 9. The infinite-horizon limit of the non-standard Riccati equation
A 10. A contractive solution for A 9.
A 11. A subspace invariance solution for A 4. and A.9
A 12. A subspace invariance solution for A 5. and A.9
A 13. Asymptotic stability condition for NS information structure
where w¯t :=
∑n
i=1 α
i
nw
i
t. The above change of coordinates
is a gauge transformation, which is a powerful tool in the
theoretical analysis of invariant physics [30]. In short, a
gauge transformation manipulates the degrees of freedom of
a physical (invariant) system without altering its behaviour. It
is to be noted that the gauge transformation technique is more
general than the completion-of-square method introduced in
the mean-field-type game [20], [21], which is a single-agent
control problem. In particular, the transformation technique
was initially introduced in [26], showcased in mean-field
teams [31] and weighted mean-field teams [32], and has
recently been extended to deep structured teams in [13]. The
present paper is the first work investigating the efficiency of
this technique in a nonzero-sum game, with both collaborative
and non-collaborative costs. Note also that the nonzero-sum
game is a more complicated problem than the above control
problems (as briefly mentioned in Section I).
For PS information structure, knowing xt and ut is equiv-
alent to knowing x˜t := vec(∆x1t , . . . ,∆x
n
t , x¯t) and u˜t :=
vec(∆u1t , . . . ,∆u
n
t , u¯t), respectively. From (1), (2) and (7), it
follows that for every i ∈ Nn:[
∆xit+1
x¯t+1
]
= At
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+ Bt
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
[
∆wit
w¯t
]
, (8)
where At := diag(At, At+A¯t) and Bt := diag(Bt, Bt+B¯t).
The gauge transformation introduces the orthogonal relations:
n∑
i=1
αin(∆x
i
t)
ᵀGxt x¯t = 0,
n∑
i=1
αin(∆u
i
t)
ᵀGut u¯t = 0. (9)
From (9), the per-step cost of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT ,
given by (3), can be expressed as follows:
cit(x˜t, u˜t) :=
[
∆xit
x¯t
]ᵀ
Q
αin
t
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+
[
∆uit
u¯t
]ᵀ
R
αin
t
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
n∑
j=1
αjn
(
(∆xjt )
ᵀGxt (∆x
j
t ) + (∆u
j
t )
ᵀGut (∆u
j
t )
)
− α
i
n
1− αin
(
(∆xit)
ᵀGxt (∆x
i
t) + (∆u
i
t)
ᵀGut (∆u
i
t)
)
, (10)
where
Q
αin
t :=
[
Qt +
αin
1−αinG
x
t Qt + S
x
t
Qt + S
x
t Qt + 2S
x
t + Q¯t +G
x
t
]
,
R
αin
t :=
[
Rt +
αin
1−αinG
u
t Rt + S
u
t
Rt + S
u
t Rt + 2S
u
t + R¯t +G
u
t
]
. (11)
In the sequel, we occasionally use superscript n and α to
highlight the dependence of some parameters with respect to
the number of players and the individual weight (which itself
depends on the number of players), respectively. We define a
non-standard Riccati equation which will help formulate the
solution. For any t ∈ NT and α ∈ An, define matrices Pα1:T
backward in time as follows:
Pαt = Q
α
t + A
ᵀ
tP
α
t+1At + (θ
α
t )
ᵀBᵀtP
α
t+1At
+AᵀtP
α
t+1Btθ
α
t + (θ
α
t )
ᵀ(Rαt + B
ᵀ
tP
α
t+1Bt)θ
α
t ,
PαT+1 = 02dx×2dx ,
(12)
where θαt =: diag(θt(α), θ¯t(α)), θt(α) and θ¯t(α) are defined
below:
θt(α) := (Ft(α))
−1Kt(α), θ¯αt := (F¯t(α))
−1K¯t(α),
Ft(α) := (1− α)
[
Rt +
α
1− αG
u
t +B
ᵀ
t P
α
t+1
1,1Bt
]
+ α
[
Rt + S
u
t + (Bt + B¯t)
ᵀPαt+1
1,2Bt
]
,
F¯t(α) := (1− α)
[
Rt + S
u
t +B
ᵀ
t P
α
t+1
2,1(Bt + B¯t)
]
+ α
[
Rt + 2S
u
t + R¯t +G
u
t + (Bt + B¯t)
ᵀPαt+1
2,2(Bt + B¯t)
]
,
Kt(α) := −(1− α)
[
Bᵀt P
α
t+1
1,1At
]
− α
[
(Bt + B¯t)
ᵀPαt+1
1,2At
]
,
K¯t(α) := −(1− α)
[
Bᵀt P
α
t+1
2,1(At + A¯t)
]
− α
[
(Bt + B¯t)
ᵀPαt+1
2,2(At + A¯t)
]
. (13)
Also, define matrices Pα1:T backward in time as follows:
Pαt := G
x
t +A
ᵀ
t P
α
t+1At + (θ
α
t )
ᵀBᵀt P
α
t+1At
+Aᵀt P
α
t+1Btθ
α
t + (θ
α
t )
ᵀ(Gut +B
ᵀ
t P
α
t+1Bt)θ
α
t ,
PαT+1 = 0dx×dx .
(14)
Remark 4. Equations (12) and (14) are symmetric, yet non-
standard, Riccati equations that always admit a solution if
matrices Ft(α) and F¯t(α) are invertible, t ∈ NT .
B. Sufficient conditions
We now introduce a few sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of a unique sub-game perfect Nash solution, which can
be easily verified by recursively using equations (12) and (13).
Assumption 2 (Homogeneous weights). At any time t ∈ NT ,
matrix (1 − 1n )Ft( 1n ) + 1n F¯t( 1n ) is positive definite, and
matrices Ft( 1n ) and F¯t(
1
n ) are invertible.
Assumption 3 (Asymptotically vanishing weights). Let As-
sumption 1 hold. In addition, there exist a sufficiently
large n0 ∈ N and a constant matrix C such that (1 −
α)Ft(α) + αF¯t(α) is positive definite, and matrices Ft(α)
and F¯t(α) are invertible, where F−1t (α), F¯
−1
t (α)  C,
∀α ∈ [−γmax/n0, γmax/n0].
For a special model described in Assumption 4, Assump-
tion 3 holds and the non-standard Riccati equation (12) gets
decomposed into two standard Riccati equations, as n→∞.
Assumption 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and n is suffi-
ciently large. Let matrices A¯t and B¯t be zero. Let also matrices
Qt and Qt+Sxt be positive semi-definite and matrices Rt and
Rt + S
u
t be positive definite.
Proposition 2 (Decoupled standard Riccati equations in the in-
finite-population model). Let Assumption 4 hold. The infinite-
population solution of the non-standard Riccati equation (12)
can be expressed as follows:
Pt = diag(Qt, Qt + S
x
t ) + A
ᵀ
tPt+1At −AᵀtPt+1Bt
×(diag(Rt, Rt + Sut ) + BᵀtPt+1Bt)−1BᵀtPt+1At,
PT+1 = 02dx×2dx ,
(15)
where at any t ∈ NT ,
diag(θt(0), θ¯t(0)) := −(diag(Rt, Rt+Sut )+BᵀtPt+1Bt)−1
×BᵀtPt+1At. (16)
Proof. For a sufficiently large n, α ∈ [−γmaxn , γmaxn ] can
be chosen sufficiently small so that Ft(α) ≈ (1 − α)(Rt +
Bᵀt P
α
t+1
1,1Bt) and F¯t(α) ≈ (1− α)(Rt + Sut +Bᵀt Pαt+12,1Bt).
Consequently, matrices Ft(α) and F¯t(α) become positive
definite, and are uniformly bounded in α and T . Therefore, As-
sumption 4 satisfies Assumption 3, and the infinite-population
solution of the non-standard Riccati equation (12) can be refor-
mulated as follows: Pt2,2 := P0t
2,1 and Pt1,1 := P0t
1,1. 
Another interesting model is when the individualized terms
in (3) are set to zero. In this case, the equilibrium exists for any
arbitrary set of positive weights (not necessarily homogeneous
or asymptotically vanishing weights), where the solution is
independent of the weights.
Assumption 5 (Social cost with arbitrary positive weights).
Let Qt, Sxt , Rt, S
u
t be zero, t ∈ NT , and weights be positive
αin > 0, ∀i ∈ Nn. Let also Gxt and Q¯t + Gxt be positive
semi-definite, and Gut and R¯t +G
u
t be positive definite.
Proposition 3 (Decoupled standard Riccati equations for
social cost). For the social cost, the solution can be obtained
by two decoupled standard Riccati equations as follows:
Pt = diag(G
x
t , Q¯t +G
x
t ) + A
ᵀ
tPt+1At −AᵀtPt+1Bt
×(diag(Gut , R¯t +Gut ) + BᵀtPt+1Bt)−1BᵀPt+1At,
PT+1 = 02dx×2dx ,
(17)
where at any t ∈ NT , P1,1t = Pt and
diag(θt,θ¯t):=−(diag(Gut ,R¯t+Gut )+BᵀtPt+1Bt)−1BᵀPt+1At.
(18)
Proof. The proof is deferred to Theorem 1. 
C. Solution of Problem 1
Define scalars `i1:T backward in time for any t ∈ NT and
i ∈ Nn as follows:
`it := `
i
t+1 + Tr
(
AC(vec(∆wit, w¯t))P
αin
t+1
)
+
∑n
j=1α
j
n Tr
(
AC(∆wjt )P
αin
t+1
)− αin Tr(AC(∆wit)Pαint+1)1−αin ,
`iT+1 = 0.
Theorem 1. The following holds for Problem 1.
• Let Assumption 2 hold for homogeneous weights. There
exists a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for
any number of players such that for any player i ∈ Nn,
uit = θ
n
t x
i
t + (θ¯
n
t − θnt )x¯t, t ∈ NT , (19)
where θnt := θ(
1
n ) and θ¯
n
t := θ¯t(
1
n ) are given by (13).
• Let Assumption 3 hold for asymptotically vanishing
weights. As n → ∞, there exists a unique sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium such that for any player i ∈ N,
uit = θ
∞
t x
i
t + (θ¯
∞
t − θ∞t )x¯t, t ∈ NT , (20)
where θ∞t := θt(0) and θ¯
∞
t := θ¯t(0) are given by (13).
• Let Assumption 5 hold. There exists a unique sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium for arbitrary number of players
and positive weights such that for any player i ∈ Nn and
any weight αin > 0,
uit = θtx
i
t + (θ¯t − θt)x¯t, t ∈ NT , (21)
where θt := θt(αin) and θ¯t := θ¯t(α
i
n) do not depend on
the weight αin, and are given by (18).
• The optimal cost of player i in the above cases can be
computed as follows:
J∗,in = Tr
(
AC(vec(∆xi1, x¯1))P
αin
1
)
+ `i1
+
n∑
j=1
αjn Tr
(
AC(∆xj1)P
αin
1
)−αin Tr (AC(∆xi1)Pαin1 )
1− αin
.
Proof. Fix the strategies of all players but player i, i.e. g−i1:T .
The resultant optimization problem from the player i’s view
is Markovian; hence, one can write the following dynamic
program to identify the best response strategy of player i:
V it (x˜t) = min
uit
(E[cit(x˜t, u˜t) + V
i
t+1(x˜t+1) | x˜t, u˜t]), (22)
where V iT+1(x˜T+1) = 0. Notice that the value function
V it (x˜t) depends on g
−i
1:T , which naturally leads to a fixed-point
equation. We will show in the sequel that there is only one
consistent solution V it (x˜t), i ∈ Nn, to construct a sequential
Nash equilibrium under Assumptions 2, 3 and 5 (i.e., the fixed-
point equation has a unique solution). To this end, we prove
by backward induction that the value function of player i at
time t ∈ NT+1 takes the following form:
V it (x˜t) =
[
∆xit
x¯t
]ᵀ
P
αin
t
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+ `it
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t )
ᵀPα
i
n
t (∆x
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit)
ᵀPα
i
n
t (∆x
i
t).
(23)
It is straightforward to verify that (23) holds at t = T + 1 due
to the boundary conditions. Suppose that (23) holds at t+ 1:
V it+1(x˜t+1) =
[
∆xit+1
x¯t+1
]ᵀ
P
αin
t+1
[
∆xit+1
x¯t+1
]
+ `it+1
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t+1)
ᵀPα
i
n
t+1∆x
j
t+1−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit+1)
ᵀPα
i
n
t+1∆x
i
t+1.
(24)
It is desired now to show that (23) holds at time t as well.
From (10), (22), and (24), it follows that:
V it (x˜t) = min
uit
E
[
∆xit
x¯t
]ᵀ
Q
αin
t
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+
[
∆uit
u¯t
]ᵀ
R
αin
t
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t )
ᵀGxt (∆x
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit)
ᵀGxt (∆x
i
t)
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆u
j
t )
ᵀGut (∆u
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆uit)
ᵀGut (∆u
i
t)
+
[
∆xit+1
x¯t+1
]ᵀ
P
αin
t+1
[
∆xit+1
x¯t+1
]
+ `it+1 +
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t+1)
ᵀ
× Pαint+1∆xjt+1 −
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit+1)
ᵀPα
i
n
t+1∆x
i
t+1.
Incorporating (8) in the above equation yields:
V it (x˜t) = min
uit
E
[
∆xit
x¯t
]ᵀ
Q
αin
t
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+
[
∆uit
u¯t
]ᵀ
R
αin
t
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t )
ᵀGxt (∆x
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit)
ᵀGxt (∆x
i
t)
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆u
j
t )
ᵀGut (∆u
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆uit)
ᵀGut (∆u
i
t)
+ (At
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+ Bt
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
[
∆wit
w¯t
]
)ᵀPα
i
n
t+1(At
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+ Bt
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
+
[
∆wit
w¯t
]
) + `it+1 +
∑
j 6=i
αjn(At∆x
j
t +Bt∆u
j
t
+ ∆wjt )
ᵀPα
i
n
t+1(At∆x
j
t +Bt∆u
j
t + ∆w
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(At∆x
i
t
+Bt∆u
i
t + ∆w
i
t)
ᵀPα
i
n
t+1(At∆x
i
t +Bt∆u
i
t + ∆w
i
t). (25)
In order to find a minimizer uit, one can differentiate (25) with
respect to uit and set the derivative to zero. According to (7),
the following relations hold for any i, j ∈ Nn, j 6= i:
∂∆uit
∂uit
= 1− αin,
∂u¯t
∂uit
= αin,
∂∆ujt
∂uit
= −αin. (26)
From (26) and after eliminating the terms depending on local
noises (since they are independent from actions and have zero
mean), one arrives at:[
(1− αin)Idu×du
αinIdu×du
]ᵀ
R
αin
t
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
− αin
( n∑
j=1
αjn(∆u
j
t )
ᵀGut
)
+
[
(1− αin)Idu×du
αinIdu×du
]ᵀ
BᵀtP
αin
t+1At
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+
[
(1− αin)Idu×du
αinIdu×du
]ᵀ
BᵀtP
αin
t+1Bt
[
∆uit
u¯t
]
− αin
(∑
j 6=i
αjn
× (∆xjt )ᵀAᵀt Pα
i
n
t+1Bt + α
i
n(∆x
i
t)
ᵀAᵀt P
αin
t+1Bt
)− αin(∑
j 6=i
αjn
× (∆ujt )ᵀBᵀt Pα
i
n
t+1Bt + α
i
n(∆u
i
t)
ᵀBᵀt P
αin
t+1Bt
)
= 0. (27)
Due to the linear dependence introduced by the gauge trans-
formation, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 α
j
n∆x
j
t = 0dx×1 and
∑n
j=1 α
j
n∆u
j
t =
0du×1, equation (27) is simplified as:[
(1− αin)Idu×du
αinIdu×du
]ᵀ (
R
αin
t + B
ᵀ
tP
αin
t+1Bt
)[∆uit
u¯t
]
=
−
[
(1− αin)Idu×du
αinIdu×du
]ᵀ
BᵀtP
αin
t+1At
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
. (28)
Equation (28) can be rewritten in terms of matrices Ft(αin),
F¯t(α
i
n), Kt(α
i
n) and K¯t(α
i
n), defined in (13), as follows:
Ft(α
i
n)∆u
i
t + F¯t(α
i
n)u¯t = Kt(α
i
n)∆x
i
t + K¯t(α
i
n)x¯t. (29)
It is important to notice that equation (29) holds irrespective
of the strategies of other players. Equivalently, equation (29)
can be expressed in terms of the actions of other players, i.e.
((1− αin)Ft(αin) + αinF¯t(αin))uit = (K¯t(αin)−Kt(αin))
×
∑
j 6=i
αjnx
j
t + ((1− αin)Kt(αin) + αinK¯t(αin))xit
− (F¯t(αin)− Ft(αin))
∑
j 6=i
αjnu
j
t , (30)
where (30) constitutes the standard fixed-point equation across
all players i ∈ Nn. Since the control laws of all other players,
i.e. g−it , at time t are fixed and the action u
i
t has no effect
on its past (i.e. x1:t), one can conclude that
∑
j 6=i α
j
nu
j
t =∑
j 6=i α
j
ng
j
t (x1:t) is independent of action u
i
t. Therefore, ac-
tion uit in equation (30) is the unique minimizer and the best-
response action of player i if the second derivative, i.e., matrix
(1−αin)Ft(αin) +αinF¯t(αin) is positive definite, guaranteeing
strict convexity.
We now show that (29) (equivalently (30)) admits only one
consistent solution across all players under Assumptions 2, 3
and 5. For this reason, we consider three different cases:
1) Let Assumption 2 hold and αin = 1/n. The following
equalities are obtained by averaging (29) over all play-
ers and upon noting that
∑n
i=1 α
i
n∆x
i
t = 0dx×1 and∑n
i=1 α
i
n∆u
i
t = 0du×1:
∆uit = F
−1
t (
1
n
)Kt(
1
n
)∆xit, u¯t = F¯
−1
t (
1
n
)K¯t(
1
n
)x¯t.
(31)
2) Define δn := [−γmax/n, γmax/n] and let Assumption 3
hold, where αin = γ
i/n, ∀i ∈ Nn. Pick a suffi-
ciently large n0 such that αin ∈ δn ⊆ δn0 . Un-
der Assumption 3, F−1t (α
i
n) and F¯
−1
t (α
i
n), ∀αin ∈
δn, exist and are uniformly bounded with respect to
αin. In addition, from (12) and (13), it follows that
F−1t (α
i
n) and F¯
−1
t (α
i
n), ∀αin ∈ δn, are continuous
in αin, which implies that the infinite-population limits
exist (due to the uniform boundedness and continuity),
i.e., limn→∞P
αin
t = P
0
t , limn→∞ Ft(α
i
n) = Ft(0),
limn→∞Kt(αin) = Kt(0), and so on. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
αinKt(α
i
n)∆x
i
n = Kt(0) lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
αin∆x
i
n,
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
αinFt(α
i
n)∆u
i
n = Ft(0) lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
αin∆u
i
n,
where the above exchange of the limit and summation
is possible due to the fact that
∑n
i=1 α
i
nKt(α
i
n)∆x
i
n
and
∑n
i=1 α
i
nFt(α
i
n)∆u
i
n are lower and upper bounded
by some matrices that do not depend on n, due
to population-size-independent model assumption. By
weighted averaging (29) over all players, one gets the
following in the infinite-population limit:
∆uit = (Ft(0))
−1Kt(0)∆xit, u¯t = (F¯t(0))
−1K¯t(0)x¯t.
(32)
3) Let Assumption 5 hold. Since αin is positive, one can
multiply the per-step cost of player i by the positive
number 1−α
i
n
αin
, which does not affect the best-response
optimization at player i ∈ Nn. Next, one can use a
backward induction to show that Pα
i
n
t is diagonal, i.e.,
P
αin
t
2,1
and Pα
i
n
t
1,2
are zero. In such a case, (28) holds
irrespective of αin because all terms happen to have the
same coefficient (1− αin), which can be removed from
both sides of the equality, i.e,
(1− αin)(Gut +Bᵀt P1,1t+1Bt)∆uit + (1− αin)(R¯t +Gut
+ (Bt + B¯t)
ᵀP2,2t+1(Bt + B¯t))u¯t = (1− αin)(Bᵀt P1,1t+1
×At)∆xit + (1− αin)((Bt + B¯t)ᵀP2,2t+1(At + A¯t))x¯t.
(33)
Thus, weighted averaging (33) over all players yields:
∆uit = (G
u
t +B
ᵀ
t P
1,1
t+1Bt)
−1Bᵀt P
1,1
t+1At)∆x
i
t,
u¯t = (R¯t +G
u
t + (Bt + B¯t)
ᵀP2,2t+1(Bt + B¯t))
−1
× (Bt + B¯t)ᵀP2,2t+1(At + A¯t))x¯t. (34)
The last step in the induction is to incorporate (31) and (32)
into (25) in order to retrieve (23), where for α ∈ {0, 1n},
Pαt =Q
α
t +(θ
α
t )
ᵀRαt θ
α
t +(At+Btθ
α
t )
ᵀPαt+1(At+Btθ
α
t ),
where θαt is described by (13). Similarly, one can plug (34)
into (25) in order to obtain (17).
Finally, it is concluded that strategy (19) is a unique
equilibrium under Assumption 2 because it satisfies the unique
best-response condition in (30) and unique consistent solution
across all players in (31), upon noting that the original vari-
ables can be uniquely computed from the auxiliary variables
as follows: xit = ∆x
i
t + x¯t and u
i
t = ∆u
i
t + u¯t. Similarly,
strategy (20) is a unique equilibrium under Assumption 3
because it satisfies the unique best-response condition in (30)
and unique consistent solution across all players in (32). For
the cooperative cost, strategy (21) is a unique equilibrium
under Assumption 5 because it satisfies the unique consistent
solution across all players in (34), and the unique best-
response condition, where the second derivative is always
positive definite, which is ((1−αin)(Gut +Bᵀt P1,1t+1Bt)−1Bᵀt )+
αin(R¯t + G
u
t + (Bt + B¯t)
ᵀP2,2t+1(Bt + B¯t))
−1), αin > 0,
guaranteeing strict convexity. 
Remark 5. In the infinite-population game with asymptot-
ically vanishing weights, the solution under Assumption 4,
given by (16), is independent of matrices Q¯t, R¯t, Gxt and G
u
t
(e.g., independent of the collaborative term). On the other
hand, when the cost is equal to the collaborative term, as
described in Assumption 5, the infinite-population solution
in (18) depends on matrices Q¯t, R¯t, Gxt and G
u
t . For the
infinite-population case with decoupled dynamics, the solution
of the collaborative game is equal to that of the competitive
one if Qt = Gxt , Rt = G
u
t , S
x
t = Q¯t, and S
u
t = R¯t, ∀t ∈ N,
according to (16) and (18). In such a case, the best selfish
action is equivalent to the best selfless action.
Remark 6. The non-standard Riccati equation (12) is different
from the standard coupled Riccati equations. To see this,
please notice that the size of n coupled matrix Riccati equa-
tions should increase with the number of players n while that
of the non-standard one in (12) is independent of n. In addi-
tion, for homogeneous weights, one would get n exchangeable
coupled matrix Riccati equations due to the exchangeablity of
players; however, our proposed Riccati equation would not
be exchangeable because Ft(α) 6= F¯t(α). This difference
becomes clearer when we consider n = 2 players with ho-
mogeneous weights. In such a case, the classical standard two
coupled Riccati equations are exchangeable, i.e., P1,1t = P
2,2
t ,
but this is not true for the non-standard Riccati equation.
D. Solution of Problem 2
Corollary 1. The solutions presented in Theorem 1 are also
the solutions of Problem 2.
Proof. From Theorem 1, it follows that the solution of Prob-
lem 1 is unique and implementable under the DSS information
structure, implying that the solution of Problem 2 must coin-
cide with that of Problem 1 because GDSS ⊆ GPS. 
Remark 7. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 hold even if the initial
states and local noises are non-exchangeable, non-Gaussian
and fully correlated across players. This is an immediate
consequence of the proof of Theorem 1 which shows that
the sub-game perfect equilibrium does not depend on the
probability distribution of the initial states and driving noises
as long as they are white (i.e., independent over time). In
addition, it is to be noted that the computational complexity of
the solution does not depend on the number of players because
the dimension of the non-standard Riccati equation (12) is
independent of the number of players.
According to the Nash equilibrium presented in Corollary 1,
at every stage of the game, players make their decisions based
on their current local states (private information) and the deep
state (public information), irrespective of what has happened
in the past, i.e., the players are not penalized or rewarded for
their past actions. However, this will not generally hold for
NS information structure because players need to construct
an error-prone prediction of the unobserved deep state; see
Section IV for more details.
E. Informationally non-unique solutions in finite- and infinite-
population games
For stochastic games wherein initial states and local noises
have non-zero probability distribution over any open set in
Rdx (e.g., multivariate Gaussian probability distribution), the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium presented in Theorem 1
and Corollary 1 is also the unique Nash solution, according
to [33, Proposition 2]. In addition, it is the unique open-
loop Nash equilibrium for deterministic models, according
to [8, Theorem 3]; however, it is not necessarily the only
Nash equilibrium. In particular, the stochastic game admits
a unique Nash solution if Assumptions 2–5 are satisfied, i.e.,
the unique Nash solution coincides with the unique feedback
Nash solution of the deterministic version of the game; see [10,
Corollary 4 of Chapter 6]. Note that the deterministic game
may admit more than one Nash solutions under the above
assumptions. To demonstrate this, we borrow some remarks
from [5] to explain the non-uniqueness aspect of the solution,
also called informationally non-unique solutions. Consider a
two-player game (i.e., n = 2), where the Nash strategy is
linear in the states of players. When there is no uncertainty
(deterministic case), the state of player 1 can be represented
by the previous states of players 1 and 2 in many different
ways. Each representation may lead to a different optimization
problem for player 2, resulting in a distinct solution. On the
other hand, when the model is stochastic, there is only one
unique representation of the solution, which is the closed-loop
memoryless representation in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
The above informational non-uniqueness feature is useful
in explaining some of the non-uniqueness results in the
infinite-population game. Due to the asymptotically negligible
(vanishing) effect of individuals, one can express the infinite-
population game as a two-player game between a generic
player and an infinite-population player. When local noises are
independent, the dynamics of the deep state (i.e., the state of
the infinite-population player) becomes deterministic; hence,
the deep state may be viewed as an external predictable effect
called (weighted) mean-field. The mean-field can be repre-
sented in different ways based on its previous states, where
each representation may lead to a different best-response
equation at the generic player, resulting in non-unique solu-
tions. Consequently, the infinite-population game can have a
unique sequential equilibrium but admit uncountably many
non-sequential ones, or have no sequential equilibrium but
still admit a Nash equilibrium. An immediate implication
of the above discussion is that mean-field equilibrium does
not necessarily coincide with the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. For classical models with a tracking cost function,
however, it is shown that Assumption 3 holds, implying that
the classical mean-field equilibrium coincides with the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium; see Subsection VI-B2.
IV. MAIN RESULTS FOR PROBLEM 3
So far, we have assumed that the deep state can be shared
among players; however, this is not always feasible, specially
when the number of players is large. In this case, the dynamic
programming decomposition proposed in the previous section
does not work because the optimization problem from each
player’s point of view is no longer Markovian. In other
words, players do not have access to a sufficient statistic of
the past history of states and actions of all players. As a
result, we propose asymptotic equilibria under NS information
structure, when the weights are asymptotically vanishing. In
particular, we study the homogeneous weights with a special
interest because they lead to a finite-population (population-
size-dependent) approximation that is generally different from
the infinite-population (population-size-independent) approxi-
mation. To establish the main results, we restrict attention to
Assumption 1 as well as the following assumptions, unless
stated otherwise.
Assumption 6. The initial local states (x11, . . . , xn1 ) are inde-
pendent random variables with identical mean µx ∈ Rdx (that
is bounded and independent of n). In addition, local noises
(w1t , . . . , w
n
t ), t ∈ NT , are independent random variables.
Furthermore, auto-covariance matrices AC(xi1) and AC(w
i
t)
are bounded and independent of n for any i ∈ Nn and t ∈ NT .
Assumption 7. For asymptotically vanishing weights, there
exists a sufficiently large n0 ∈ N such that the SPNE strategy
g∗n exists and is unique for any n ≥ n0, and takes the form:
uit = θ
n
t x
i
t + (θ¯
n
t − θnt )x¯t, (35)
where θnt and θ¯
n
t are continuous and uniformly bounded in n,
i.e., limn→∞ θnt = θ
∞
t and limn→∞ θ¯
n
t = θ¯
∞
t .
Proposition 4 (Sufficient conditions for Assumption 7). Two
sufficient conditions for Assumption 7 are as follows. For
homogeneous weights, Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for every
n ≥ n0. For the social cost function with positive weights,
Assumptions 1 and 5 hold.
Proof. The proof of the homogeneous case follows from
Theorem 1 and the fact that matrices in the dynamics and
cost functions are independent of n under Assumption 1, the
weights αin = 1/n are continuous in n, and strategy (19) is
uniformly bounded and continuous in n, according to (12)
and (13). Similarly, the proof of the social cost follows from
Theorem 1 and the fact that g∗n is independent of n. 
We now present two types of prediction for the deep state,
where the first one is a population-size-dependent prediction
and the second one is a population-size-independent one.
Definition 6 (Population-size-dependent prediction). For a
finite-population game with n players, the expected value of
the deep state under the SPNE strategy, given by (35), is
referred to as the population-size-dependent prediction,
znt+1 := (At + A¯t + (Bt + B¯t)θ¯
n
t )z
n
t , t ∈ NT , (36)
where the initial value zn1 := E[x¯1].
Definition 7 (Population-size-independent (mean-field) predic-
tion). For an infinite-population game, the deep state under the
SPNE strategy, given by (35), is referred to as the population-
size-independent (mean-field) prediction,
z∞t+1 := (At + A¯t + (Bt + B¯t)θ¯
∞
t )z
∞
t , t ∈ NT , (37)
where the initial value z∞1 := E[x¯1].
An immediate observation is that: (a) znt = x¯t in determin-
istic game, (b) znt = z
∞
t for the social cost with population-
size-independent model as θnt = θ
∞
t , and (c) z
n
t 6= z∞t for
homogeneous weights, in general, as θnt 6= θ∞t . The above
predictions can be used in the SPNE strategy g∗n in (35) to
obtain approximate equilibria. To measure the quality of the
approximate equilibria, the following two gaps are defined.
Definition 8 (Performance gap). The performance gap of an
NS strategy gˆ is defined as the maximum loss of performance
that a player can experience when all players switch from the
SPNE strategy g∗n to the strategy gˆ. In particular, at any stage
of the game t0 ∈ NT ,
∆JP (gˆ,g
∗
n)t0 := max
i∈Nn
|∆J iP (gˆ,g∗n)t0 |,
where ∆J iP (gˆ,g
∗
n)t0 := J
i
n(gˆ
i, gˆ−i)t0 − J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in )t0 .
Definition 9 (Rationality gap). The rationality gap of an NS
strategy gˆ is defined as the maximum benefit that a player can
achieve by unilateral deviation when all other players switch
from the SPNE strategy g∗n to the strategy gˆ. In particular, at
any stage t0 ∈ NT ,
∆JR(gˆ,g
∗
n)t0 := sup
gi
|∆J iR(gi, gˆ,g∗n)t0 |,
where ∆J iR(g
i, gˆ,g∗n)t0 := J
i
n(g
i, gˆ−i)t0 − J in(gi, gˆ∗,−in )t0 .
By definition, the above gaps are zero when gˆ = g∗n.
A. Two asymptotic equilibria
In this subsection, we propose two asymptotic equilibria,
where the first one uses the population-size-dependent predic-
tion and the second one uses the population-size-independent
prediction for asymptotically vanishing weights.
To distinguish between games under DSS and NS infor-
mation structures, let xˆit ∈ Rdx and uˆit ∈ Rdu , respectively,
denote the state and action of player i ∈ Nn at time t ∈ NT
under NS information structure. Let ˆ¯xt :=
∑n
i=1 α
i
nxˆ
i
t and
ˆ¯ut :=
∑n
i=1 α
i
nuˆ
i
t, t ∈ NT . Let also the initial state of player
i be xˆi1 = x
i
1. At time t ∈ NT , the state of player i evolves
according to (2) as follows:
xˆit+1 = Atxˆ
i
t +Btuˆ
i
t + A¯t ˆ¯xt + B¯t ˆ¯ut + w
i
t, t ∈ NT , (38)
where the proposed NS control action of player i is given by:
uˆit = θ
n
t xˆ
i
t + (θ¯
n
t − θnt )znt . (SAPDE) (39)
Alternatively, one can use the infinite-population solution (that
does not depend on n) as follows:
uˆit = θ
∞
t xˆ
i
t + (θ¯
∞
t − θ∞t )z∞t . (SWMFE) (40)
In the sequel, strategies (39) and (40) are denoted by
gˆn and gˆ∞, respectively, and are referred to as sequential
asymptotic population-size-dependent equilibrium (SAPDE)
and sequential weighted mean-field equilibrium (SWMFE).2
It is to be noted that the above strategies can be implemented
under NS information structure, where each player i observes
its local state xˆit and computes the prediction signals z
n
1:T and
z∞1:T , according to (36) and (37), respectively.
B. Asymptotic analysis
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1, 6 and 7 hold for any n ≥ n0.
The following performance gaps converge to zero at any
t0 ∈ NT , as n → ∞: limn→∞∆JP (gˆn,g∗n)t0 = 0 and
limn→∞∆JP (gˆ∞,g∗n)t0 = 0.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B. 
Let CL[0, T ] denote the space of measurable functions
gt : Rtdx → Rdu , t ∈ NT , that are adapted to the σ-algebra
generated by the random variables {xi1, wi1, . . . , wiT }, and are
Lipschitz continuous in the (local state) space and uniformly
bounded in time. A special case of such functions is the set
of stable feedback strategies.
Assumption 8. Suppose one of the followings holds.
I. (Decoupled dynamics): Let A¯t and B¯t, t ∈ NT , be zero.
II. (Continuous unilateral deviation): The unilateral devia-
tions are restricted to Lipschitz continuous strategies in
the local state space, i.e. gi ∈ CL[0, T ].
Remark 8. For coupled dynamics with discontinuous uni-
lateral strategy gi, there is no guarantee that the proposed
strategies are asymptotic Nash equilibria because in such a
case, limε→0 git(x
i
t + ε1dx×1) 6= git(xit). The restriction to the
continuous strategies is a standard assumption in the literature
of mean-field games and extends the asymptotic results to
coupled dynamics with PS unilateral deviations gi ∈ GPS.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 1, 6, 7 and 8 hold for any n ≥ n0,
n0 ∈ N. The following rationality gaps converge to zero at
any t0 ∈ NT , as n → ∞: limn→∞∆JR(gˆn,g∗n)t0 = 0 and
limn→∞∆JR(gˆ∞,g∗n)t0 = 0.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix C. 
2Note that strategies (39) and (40) are not in the form of forward-backward
equations and their numerical computation requires no fixed-point condition,
i.e., their complexity increases only linearly with respect to the horizon T .
C. A non-asymptotic result
Define the following relative errors at time t ∈ NT for any
player i ∈ Nn:
eit := xˆ
i
t− ˆ¯xt, ζit = xit−x¯t, et := ˆ¯xt−znt , ζt := x¯t−znt .
(41)
In addition, denote ∆xˆit = xˆ
i
t − ˆ¯xt and ∆uˆit = uˆit − ˆ¯ut.
Lemma 3. Let Assumption 7 hold. Given any player i ∈ Nn
and any time t ∈ NT , ∆xit = ∆xˆit and ∆uit = ∆uˆit. This
implies that the individualized relative errors are equal, i.e.,
eit = ζ
i
t , ∀t ∈ NT , ∀i ∈ Nn. Therefore, the dynamics of
the relative errors under the finite-population strategies (35)
and (39) can be described by:
vec(eit+1, et+1, ζt+1) = A˜
n
t vec(e
i
t, et, ζt)+vec(∆w
i
t, w¯t, w¯t),
(42)
where A˜nt := diag(At +Btθ
n
t , At + A¯t + (Bt + B¯t)θ
n
t , At +
A¯t + (Bt + B¯t)θ¯
n
t ). Similarly, the dynamics of the relative
errors under the infinite-population limit of strategy (35) and
strategy (40) (when applied to the finite-population game) can
be expressed by:
vec(eit+1, et+1, ζt+1) = A˜
∞
t vec(e
i
t, et, ζt)+vec(∆w
i
t, w¯t, w¯t).
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix D. 
Since the SPNE strategy in Theorem 1 and the proposed
strategy (39) are linear, one can find the exact value of the
performance gap in terms of Lyapunov equations for any
arbitrary (not necessarily large) number of players, where the
primitive random variables can be correlated (not necessarily
independent). To illustrate this point, we show that the perfor-
mance gap ∆J iP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 with homogeneous weights can be
expressed as a quadratic function of the relative errors.
Lemma 4. Let Assumption 2 hold. The performance gap
∆J iP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 can be described as follows:
∆J iP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 = E[
T∑
t=t0
[eit et ζt]
ᵀQ˜nt [e
i
t et ζt]].
such that
Q˜nt
1,1
:= Q˜nt
2,3
:= Q˜nt
3,2
:= 0dx×dx ,
Q˜nt
1,2
:= Q1,2t + (θ
n
t )
ᵀR1,2t θ
n
t , Q˜
n
t
1,3
:= −Q1,2t − (θnt )ᵀR1,2t θ¯nt ,
Q˜nt
2,1
:= Q2,1t + (θ
n
t )
ᵀR2,1t θ
n
t , Q˜
n
t
2,2
:= Q2,2t + (θ
n
t )
ᵀR2,2t θ
n
t ,
Q˜nt
3,1
:= −Q2,1t − (θnt )ᵀR2,1t θ¯nt , Q˜nt
3,3
:= −Q2,2t − (θ¯nt )ᵀR2,2t θ¯nt ,
where Qt and Rt are given by (11), when ain =
1
n .
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that
E[et] = E[ζt] = 0dx×1,∀t ∈ NT , which is a consequence of
the linear dynamics of the relative errors and zero-mean noises.
For more details, the reader is referred to Appendix E. 
Define matrices Hx,it and H
w,i
t , i ∈ Nn, t ∈ NT such that:
Hx,it :=
[ AC(xit−x¯t) E[(xit−x¯t)x¯ᵀt ]
12×2⊗E[(xit−x¯t)x¯ᵀt ] 12×2⊗AC(x¯t)
]
,
Hw,it :=
[ AC(wit−w¯t) E[(wit−w¯t)w¯ᵀt ]
12×2⊗E[(wit−w¯t)w¯ᵀt ] 12×2⊗AC(w¯t)
]
,
where Hxt := H
x,i
t and H
w
t := H
w,i
t , ∀i ∈ Nn, for the case
when the primitive random variables are i.i.d.
Theorem 2 (A non-asymptotic result for homogeneous
weights). Let Assumption 2 hold. The performance gap of the
NS strategy (39), described in Definition 8, can be computed
by a Lyapunov equation. In particular, the following holds
given matrices A˜nt in Lemma 3 and Q˜
n
t in Lemma 4:
∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 = max
i∈Nn
(
Tr(Hx,it0 M˜
n
1 )+
T−1∑
t=t0
Tr(Hw,it M˜
n
t+1)
)
,
(43)
where{
M˜nt = A˜
n
t
ᵀ
M˜nt+1A˜
n
t + Q˜
n
t , t0 ≤ t ≤ T,
M˜nT+1 = 03dx×3dx .
(44)
Proof. From Lemmas 3 and 4, ∆J iP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 , i ∈ Nn, is a
quadratic function of the relative errors, and the relative errors
have linear dynamics. Therefore, this may be viewed as an
uncontrolled linear quadratic system where the total expected
cost can be expressed in terms of the auto-covariance matrices
of the initial states and local noises (i.e., Hx,it0 and H
w,i
t , t0 ≤
t ≤ T ) and the Lyapunov equation (44). 
D. Solution of Problem 3
It is desired now to show that the proposed strategies, given
by (39) and (40), are solutions for Problem 3.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 3 and 6 hold for the special
case of homogeneous weights for any n ≥ n0, n0 ∈ N. The
following holds for Problem 3.
1) The NS strategy (39) is a sequential asymptotic recipro-
cal equilibrium such that
εt0(n) := ∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 ∈ O(
1
n
), t0 ∈ NT . (45)
2) Let also Assumption 8 hold. Strategy (39) is a sequen-
tial asymptotic Nash equilibrium such that ε¯t0(n) :=
∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 + ∆JR(gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 , t0 ∈ NT , where
limn→∞ ε¯t0(n) = 0.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix F. 
Theorem 4. Let Assumptions 3 and 6 hold for any n ≥ n0,
n0 ∈ N. The following holds for Problem 3.
1) For the special case of homogeneous weights, the NS
strategy (40) is a sequential asymptotic reciprocal equi-
librium such that εt0(n) := ∆JP (gˆ∞,g
∗
n)t0 , t0 ∈ NT ,
where limn→∞ εt0(n) = 0.
2) Let also Assumption 8 hold. For asymptotically van-
ishing weights, strategy (40) is a sequential asymptotic
Nash equilibrium, where limn→∞ ε¯t0(n) = 0, t0 ∈ NT .
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix G. 
It is shown in Theorem 4 that SWMFE in (40) is an ASNE,
irrespective of whether or not the finite-population game has a
solution. This independence from the finite-population solution
comes from the fact that the infinite-population solution is not
necessarily the limit of the finite-population one. However,
if the finite-population solution exists according to Assump-
tion 7, one can provide a unified form for both SAPDE and
SWMFE, as described below.
Theorem 5. Let Assumptions 1, 6 and 7 hold for any n ≥ n0,
n0 ∈ N. The following holds for NS strategies (39) and (40).
1) They are sequential asymptotic reciprocal equilibria
such that at any time t0 ∈ NT :
εSAPDEt0 (n) := ∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 ,
εSWMFEt0 (n) := ∆JP (gˆ∞,g
∗
n)t0 ,
where limn→∞ εSAPDEt0 (n) = 0, limn→∞ ε
SWMFE
t0 (n) = 0.
2) Let also Assumption 8 hold. They are sequential asymp-
totic Nash equilibria such that at any time t0 ∈ NT ,
ε¯SAPDEt0 (n) := ∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 + ∆JR(gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 ,
ε¯SWMFEt0 (n) := ∆JP (gˆ∞,g
∗
n)t0 + ∆JR(gˆ∞,g
∗
n)t0 ,
where limn→∞ ε¯SAPDEt0 (n) = 0, limn→∞ ε¯
SWMFE
t0 (n) = 0.
Proof. The proof follows from Definitions 4, 5, 8, 9, Lem-
mas 1, 2, and a triangle inequality used in Theorem 3. 
Remark 9 (Population-size-dependent versus population–
size-independent asymptotic equilibria). Although NS strate-
gies (39) and (40) converge to the same (unique) Nash solution
as n→∞ under Assumption 7, they have subtle differences.
In what follows, we compare them from three different angles.
1) Existence condition: The existence of the finite-
population NS strategy (39) depends on the finite-
population solution while that of the infinite-population
NS strategy (40) depends on the infinite-population one.
See two counterexamples in Section VI demonstrating
that the finite-population game may admit a solution
while the infinite-population may not and vice versa.
2) Performance and rationality gaps: Since strategy (39)
takes the number of players into account, it potentially
leads to smaller performance and rationality gaps. For
example, when the game is deterministic and x¯1 is
known, strategy (39) becomes the SPNE (where perfor-
mance and rationality gaps are zero) while strategy (40)
remains an approximate Nash solution, in general. See
a numerical example in Section VIII.
3) Complexity of analysis: The advantage of strategy (40)
over strategy (39) is that its analysis is based on the
infinite-population model, which is simpler than that of
the finite-population one.
V. INFINITE HORIZON
In this section, we extend our main results to the infinite
horizon case. To this end, it is assumed that the model
described in Section II is time-homogeneous, and hence,
subscript t is dropped from the model parameters. Given any
discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1), define the following discounted cost
function for player i ∈ Nn:
J i,γn (g) = (1− γ)E[
∞∑
t=1
γt−1ci(xt,ut)], (46)
where the per-step cost function is given by (3).
Define the algebraic counterpart of the non-standard equa-
tions (12), given α ∈ An, as follows:
Pα = Qα + γ
(
AᵀPαA + (θα)ᵀBᵀPαA
+ AᵀPαBθα
)
+ (θα)ᵀ(Rα + γBᵀPαB)θα, (47)
where θα =: diag(θ(α), θ¯(α)), θ(α) and θ¯(α) are defined
below:
θ(α) := (F (α))−1K(α), θ¯α := (F¯ (α))−1K¯(α),
F (α) := (1− α)
[
R+
α
1− αG
u + γBᵀPα1,1B
]
+ α
[
R+ Su + γ(B + B¯)ᵀPα1,2B
]
,
F¯ (α) := (1− α)
[
R+ Su + γBᵀPα2,1(B + B¯)
]
+ α
[
R+ 2Su + R¯+Gu + γ(B + B¯)ᵀPα2,2(B + B¯)
]
,
K(α) := −(1− α)γ
[
BᵀPα1,1A
]
− αγ
[
(B + B¯)ᵀPα1,2A
]
,
K¯(α) := −(1− α)γ
[
BᵀPα2,1(A+ A¯)
]
− αγ
[
(B + B¯)ᵀPα2,2(A+ A¯)
]
. (48)
Also, define
Pα := Gx + γ
(
AᵀPαA+ (θα)ᵀBᵀPαA
+AᵀPαBθα
)
+ (θα)ᵀ(Gu + γBᵀPαB)θα. (49)
In general, it is not straightforward to derive conditions
under which the solutions of equations (12) and (14) converge
to a bounded limit as T → ∞. In Assumption 9, we
consider one such condition that induces this property, and
in Assumptions 10–12, we provide three sufficient verifiable
conditions under which Assumption 9 is satisfied.
Assumption 9. Finite-horizon solutions of the backward
ordinary difference equations (12) and (14) admit infinite-
horizon limits as T goes to infinity. More precisely, for any
α ∈ An, and fixed t ∈ NT , limT→∞PαT−t+1 =: Pα and
limT→∞ PαT−t+1 =: P
α, where Pα and Pα are the solutions
of the algebraic equations (47) and (49), respectively.
Let L1 denote the mapping from Pα to θα displayed in (48)
(where θα = L1(Pα)), and L2 denote the mapping from
θα to Pα expressed in (47) (where Pα = L2(θα)). As a
result, Pα = L2(L1(Pα)) is a fixed-point equation, that can
be solved and studied further by various fixed-point methods.
Assumption 10 (Contractive solution). Let the mapping
L2(L1(·)) be a contraction, which implies that equations (47)
and (48) admit a unique solution.
For the two special models presented in Assumptions 4
and 5, one can use the standard schur method [34] to derive
the following sufficient conditions.3
Assumption 11 (Invariance subspace solution with asymptot-
ically vanishing weights). Let Assumption 4 hold. Let also
(A,B) be stabilizable, and (A,Q1/2) and (A, (Q + Sx)1/2)
be detectable.
Assumption 12 (Invariance subspace solution for social cost
with positive weights). Let Assumption 5 hold. Let also
(A,B) and (A+ A¯, B+ B¯) be stabilizable, and (A, (Gx)1/2)
and (A+ A¯, (Q¯+Gx)1/2) be detectable.
Proposition 5 (Decoupled standard algebraic Riccati equa-
tions for infinite population). Let Assumption 11 hold. The
infinite-population solution of the non-standard Riccati equa-
tion (47) can be expressed by the following standard alge-
braic Riccati equation: P = diag(Q,Q + Sx) + γAᵀPA −
γ2AᵀPB(diag(R,R+ Su) + γBᵀPB)−1BᵀPA, where
diag(θ(0),θ¯(0)):=−γ(diag(R,R+Su)+γBᵀPB)−1BᵀPA.
Proposition 6 (Decoupled standard algebraic Riccati equations
for social cost). Let Assumption 12 hold. The social cost
solution can be expressed by the following standard algebraic
Riccati equation: P = diag(Gx, Q¯ + Gx) + γAᵀPA −
γ2AᵀPB(diag(Gu, R¯+Gu) + γBᵀPB)−1BᵀPA, where
diag(θ, θ¯) := −γ(diag(Gu, R¯+Gu) + γBᵀPB)−1BᵀPA.
(50)
A. Solutions of Problems 1 and 2
Theorem 6. The following holds for Problem 1 with the
infinite-horizon cost function (46).
• Let Assumptions 2 and 9 hold for homogeneous weights.
There exists a stationary sub-game Nash equilibrium for
any number of players such that for any player i ∈ Nn,
uit = θ
nxit + (θ¯
n − θn)x¯t, t ∈ N, (51)
where θn := θ( 1n ) and θ¯
n := θ¯( 1n ) are given by (48).
• Let Assumption 3 and 9 hold for asymptotically vanishing
weights. As n → ∞, there exists a stationary sub-game
Nash equilibrium such that for any player i ∈ N,
uit = θ
∞xit + (θ¯
∞ − θ∞)x¯t, t ∈ N, (52)
where θ∞ := θ(0) and θ¯∞ := θ¯(0) are given by (48).
• Let Assumption 12 hold. There exists a stationary sub-
game Nash equilibrium for arbitrary number of players
and positive weights such that for any player i ∈ Nn and
any weight αin > 0,
uit = θx
i
t + (θ¯ − θ)x¯t, t ∈ N, (53)
where θ := θ(αin) and θ¯ := θ¯(α
i
n) do not depend on the
weight αin, and are given by (50).
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix H. 
3Given γ ∈ (0, 1), (√γA,√γB) is stablizable and (√γA,Q1/2) is
detectable if (A,B) is stablizable and (A,Q1/2) is detectable, respectively.
B. Solutions of Problem 3
Similar to the finite-horizon NS strategies (39) and (40), we
define the following strategies for every t ∈ N:
uˆit = θ
nxˆit + (θ¯
n − θn)znt , (SAPDE) (54)
and
uˆit = θ
∞xˆit + (θ¯
∞ − θ∞)z∞t . (SWMFE) (55)
In general, NS strategies (54) and (55) can destabilize the
game due to the error propagation induced by the imperfection
of NS information structure. To see this, one can construct a
simple counterexample as follows.
Counterexample 1. Consider a game with homogeneous
weights and coupled dynamics. In this case, the game under
strategy (54) is unstable if matrix A˜nt in Lemma 3 is not
stablizable (Hurwitz), where the relative errors in (42) grow
unboundedly, despite the fact that the PS strategy (51) is
bounded under Assumptions 2 and 9.
To overcome this hurdle, the following assumption is im-
posed on the model to ensure that the game under strate-
gies (54) and (55) is stable.
Assumption 13. Let Assumptions 3 and 9 hold, and in
addition, matrix A˜n in Lemma 3 is Hurwitz for any n ≥ n0,
where A˜n is defined as A˜nt where subscript t is omitted.
Proposition 7. Let Assumption 13 hold. Then, for any n ≥ n0,
|J i,γn (gˆin, gˆ−in )| <∞ and |J i,γn (gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ )| <∞.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix I. 
Remark 10 (A sufficient condition for Assumption 13). Let
Assumptions 3 and 9 hold for any n ≥ n0. When players
are dynamically decoupled (i.e., A¯t and B¯t are zero, ∀t ∈ N),
matrix A˜n in Lemma 3 becomes Hurwitz. In particular, stabil-
ity of diagonal matrix A˜n reduces to the stability of matrices
A + Bθn and A + Bθ¯n, which represent the dynamics of
the finite- and infinite-population states under SPNE strategies
(that have infinite-horizon limits from Assumption 9).
Theorem 7. Let Assumptions 3, 6, 9 and 13 hold for the
special case of homogeneous weights for any n ≥ n0, n0 ∈ N.
The following holds for Problem 3 with the infinite-horizon
cost function.
• The NS strategy (54) is a sequential asymptotic reciprocal
equilibrium such that
εt0(n) := ∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n) = γ
t0−1((1− γ) Tr(Hxt0M˜n)
+ γ Tr(HwM˜n)
) ∈ O( 1
n
), t0 ∈ N,
where M˜n is the solution of the algebraic Lyapunov
equation: M˜n = γ(A˜n)ᵀM˜nA˜n + Q˜n.
• Let also Assumption 8 hold. Strategy (55) is a sequen-
tial asymptotic Nash equilibrium such that εt0(n) =
∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n) + ∆JR(gˆn,g
∗
n), t0 ∈ N, where
limn→∞ ε¯t0(n) = 0.
Proof. The proof follows along the same lines of the proofs of
Theorems 2 and 3, where the infinite-horizon strategy in (51)
under Assumption 9 is the limit of the finite-horizon one
in (19), as T → ∞, upon noting that strategy (54) is stable
according to Proposition 7 under Assumption 13. 
Theorem 8. Let Assumptions 3, 6, 9 and 13 hold for any
n ≥ n0, n0 ∈ N. The following holds for Problem 3 with the
infinite-horizon cost function.
• For the special case of homogeneous weights, the NS
strategy (55) is a sequential asymptotic reciprocal equi-
librium such that εt0(n) := ∆JP (gˆ∞,g
∗
n), t0 ∈ N,
where limn→∞ εt0(n) = 0.
• Let also Assumption 8 hold. For asymptotically vanishing
weights, strategy (55) is a sequential asymptotic Nash
equilibrium, where limn→∞ ε¯t0(n) = 0.
Proof. The proof follows along the same lines of the proof of
Theorem 4, where the infinite-horizon strategy in (52) under
Assumption 9 is the limit of the finite-horizon one in (20), as
T →∞, upon noting that strategy (55) is stable according to
Proposition 7 under Assumption 13. 
VI. RELATION TO MEAN-FIELD MODELS
In this section, we first present two counterexamples to
illustrate a fundamental difference between finite- and infinite-
population solutions and then, connect our homogeneous
weights results to three different infinite-population exchange-
able games, called mean-field games, mean-field-type games
and mean-field teams.
A. Two counterexamples
1) Finite-population model: Consider a finite-population
game with homogeneous weights. Let Sxt = −Qt and
Sut = −Rt, ∀t ∈ NT . In addition, let matrices Qt + 1n−1Gxt
and Q¯t + Gxt − Qt be positive semi-definite and matrices
Rt+
1
n−1G
u
t and R¯t+G
u
t −Rt positive definite, for all t ∈ NT .
In this case, it can be shown that Assumption 2 is satisfied
and, the non-standard Riccati equation (12) decomposes into
decoupled two standard Riccati equations as follows:
Pt = diag(Qt +
1
n− 1G
x
t , Q¯t +G
x
t −Qt) + AᵀtPt+1At
−AᵀtPt+1Bt(diag(Rt +
1
n− 1G
u
t , R¯t +G
u
t −Rt)
+ BᵀtPt+1Bt)
−1BᵀPt+1At, (56)
where at any t ∈ NT , P1,1t = Pt and
diag(θnt , θ¯
n
t ) := −(diag(Rt +
1
n− 1G
u
t , R¯t +G
u
t −Rt)
+BᵀtPt+1Bt)
−1BᵀPt+1At.
Counterexample 2. Consider the following scalars: Qt < 0,
Rt > 0, Sxt = −Qt, Sut = −Rt, Q¯t = Qt, R¯t = Gut = Rt,
and Gxt = −100Qt, ∀t ∈ NT . With this set of parameters,
the solution of the first Riccati equation (i.e. P1,1t , t ∈ NT )
is positive for relatively small n but it becomes negative for
sufficiently large n, because Qt in (56) becomes dominant.
Therefore, matrix Ft(0) in the infinite-population game be-
comes negative, which violates the necessary (best-response
condition obtained in the proof of Theorem 1) for the existence
of a Nash solution (note that Ft(0) =
[
Rt +B
ᵀ
t P
1,1
t+1Bt
]
). As
a result, the infinite-population game in this example admits
no solution while the finite-population game admits a unique
solution for small n.
2) Infinite-population model: Consider an infinite-
population game with homogeneous weights, where the
model parameters are chosen according to Assumption 4.
Counterexample 3. Let Q¯t, R¯t, Gxt and Gut be large negative
definite matrices for every t ∈ NT . In this case, F¯t(1/n)
in (13) becomes a large negative definite matrix violating the
positive definiteness condition (that is a necessary condition
for the best-response equation).4 On the other hand, according
to Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, the existence and uniqueness
of the solution of the infinite-population game is independent
of matrices Q¯t, R¯t, Gxt and G
u
t , because the effect of F¯t(1/n)
in Assumption 3 vanishes at the rate 1/n as n → ∞. This
means that although the Nash solution does not exist in the
finite-population game in this example, an approximate Nash
solution may exist (which is the solution of the infinite-
population game).
B. Mean-field models
In this section, we connect our homogeneous weights re-
sults to three different infinite-population exchangeable games,
called mean-field games, mean-field-type games and mean-
field teams. In general, there is no explicit relationship between
the above games as they consider different solution concepts.
In particular, mean-field game seeks a Nash solution and
mean-field team a globally team-optimal one while that of
mean-field-type game (also known as McKean-Vlasov type)
is neither Nash nor globally team-optimal, in general.5 In
fact, mean-field-type game has a single agent that strives
to hedge against uncertainty by including in its dynamics
and cost some components depending on the mean-field of a
virtual population of infinitely many identical copies of itself.
Remarkably, it turns out that LQ model is one of the very few
special models in which all the above games happen to have
some overlaps, which can now be identified due to a unified
explicit characterization of the solution presented in this paper.
1) Mean-field-type games: In LQ mean-field-type game, it
is well known that the solution is linear in the local state
and the expectation of the state of a generic player, and
that the corresponding gains are obtained by solving standard
Riccati equations (17), where the proof technique is based
on a completion-of-square method [20], [21]. Hence, LQ
mean-field-type game resembles a collaborative game with
social cost function, where the weights are homogeneous,
4Note that a large negative Q¯t+1 leads to a large negative Q¯
2,2
t+1 and
Pt+12,2, which results in a large negative F¯t(1/n) according to (13).
5In particular, it is demonstrated in [35] that the solution of LQ mean-field-
type game does not necessarily coincide with that of the LQ mean-field game
(which is a Nash equilibrium). In addition, it is shown in [13] that the (team-
optimal) infinite-population solution of the risk-sensitive LQ mean-field teams
is equivalent to its risk-neutral one, which is not the case for risk-sensitive LQ
mean-field-type game [36]. These findings suggest that the solution concept
of mean-field-type game is generally different from those of mean-field games
and mean-field teams.
information structure is DSS and the number of players is
infinite.
It is to be noted that mean-field-type model is not well
defined for finite n and/or deterministic game. For example,
in deterministic game, xt = E[xt], which reduces the mean-
field-type game to a single-agent (unconstrained) optimization
problem. In addition, it is conceptually challenging to distin-
guish between DSS and NS information structures in mean-
field-type model, mainly because it is not a multi-player game.
For instance, the role of an extra stability condition introduced
in Assumption 13 is overlooked in the literature of mean-field-
type games, for the case when the dynamics are coupled.
2) Mean-field games: For non-collaborative games with
decoupled player dynamics and a tracking cost formulation,
approximate Nash solutions for discounted and time-averaged
cost functions are proposed in [16] and [37], respectively.
Similarly for collaborative games with decoupled dynamics, an
approximate Nash solution is determined by employing mean-
field game and person-by-person approaches [38]. The solu-
tions are presented in terms of coupled forward and backward
ordinary differential equations, and are solved by some fixed-
point approaches. A drawback of these fixed-point approaches
is that they can admit more than one solutions because they
identify Nash solutions (rather than sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium). To identify some of these extra (non-unique)
Nash solutions, one may take into account the following two
phenomena: 1) informationally non-unique solutions in the
infinite-population game (see Subsection III-E) and 2) the fact
that infinite-population solution is not necessarily the limit of
the (exact) finite-population solution.
However, it can be shown that the continuous-time counter-
parts of the proposed standard Riccati equations in (15) can
solve the coupled ordinary differential equations and simplify
the existence and uniqueness conditions in [16], [37], [38].
As a result, one can conclude that the classical mean-field
game (Nash) solution coincides with the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium of the infinite-population model. A similar
relationship between forward-backward equations of mean-
field games and Riccati equations has recently been established
in [39] in terms of one symmetric and one non-symmetric
Riccati equation, which may be viewed as a special case of
our non-standard Riccati equation (12), where the information
structure is PS, weights are homogeneous, matrices B¯t, Sut ,
R¯t, Gxt and G
u
t are zero, n = ∞, and Qt + 2Sxt + Q¯t is
a positive definite matrix taking the following special form:
(I − Γt)ᵀQt(I − Γt), given a matrix Γt. In contrast to our
proposed proof technique in Theorem 1, the methodology
used in [39] is much more complicated and uses a parametric
representation of n coupled Riccati equations to show that in
the infinite-population case, the resultant set of coupled Riccati
equations converge to two (initially guessed) Riccati equations.
Note that our proposed weighted (extended) mean-field
game solution is more general than the classical one, as we
consider weighted means (rather than empirical means) with
a more general cost function than a tracking cost formulation.
In addition, we prove that for NS information structure,
an additional stability condition (similar to Assumption 13),
apart from the boundedness condition of Riccati equations in
Assumption 9, is required to ensure that the propagation of
the error associated with the imperfection of NS information
structure remains bounded in the finite-population game.
3) Mean-field teams: Mean-field teams are initially intro-
duced in [26], showcased in [31], [32], [40], [41], and have
recently been extended to deep structured teams [13]. In
such models, the solution concept is globally team-optimal.
It is observed that the Nash solution presented in Theorem 1
under Assumption 5 coincides with the team-optimal solution
of mean-field teams. This implies that the collaborative LQ
game and LQ team with an arbitrary number of players have
identical solutions under PS and DSS information structures.
Note that the Nash and team-optimal solutions are not nec-
essarily the same in LQ games with identical cost functions,
where local convexity (Nash solution) is different from global
convexity (team-optimal solution).
In addition, the authors in [42] and [43] characterize
exchangeability properties for convex static and dynamic
stochastic team problems and establish the convergence of
a sequence of team-optimal polices for n-agent teams to a
globally optimal solution as n → ∞, where the information
structure is NS and the dynamics are decoupled.
VII. GENERALIZATIONS
A salient feature of the proposed methodology is the
fact that it can be naturally extended to other variants
of LQ games such as zero-sum, risk-sensitive, multiple-
subpopulation games with collaborative and non-collaborative
sub-populations. In addition, its unified framework can shed
light on the similarities and differences between mean-field
games and mean-field-type games. This is useful in pro-
viding an explicit closed-form solution for the existing re-
sults in mean-field models. For example, major-minor mean-
field model [44] may be viewed as a special case of the
multiple-subpopulation game, where the size of the major
sub-population is one. In what follows, we briefly discuss
the extension of our results to multiple sub-populations and
multiple orthogonal linear regressions (also called features).
Consider a game with K ∈ N disjoint sub-populations,
where each sub-population k ∈ NK consists of nk ∈ N
players and fk ∈ N orthogonal linear regressions. The play-
ers are coupled through
∑K
k=1 fk ∈ N orthogonal linear
regressions of the states and actions of all players. Using
the gauge transformation proposed in [13], one can reduce
the (
∑K
k=1 nk)-player game to a (
∑K
k=1 fk + 1)-player game
wherein (
∑K
k=1 nk) standard coupled matrix Riccati equations
reduce to (
∑K
k=1 fk + 1) non-standard coupled matrix Riccati
equations. For example, in this article, one has k = f = 1,
which leads to 2 non-standard coupled matrix Riccati equa-
tions, presented in one formulation as in (12). For the special
case of major-minor model, one has K = 2 and fk = 1,
k ∈ NK , where the major’s state is equal to its feature, because
its size is one, i.e., x0t = x¯
0
t , leading to 2 + (2− 1) = 3 non-
standard coupled matrix Riccati equations.
Other interesting generalizations could be reinforcement
learning [45], [46], min-LQG games [47], common-noise [48]
and Markov jumps [49], to name only a few.
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Fig. 3. The performance gap in Example 1 for the two NS strategies proposed
in (39) and (40).
VIII. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A numerical example is presented to illustrate the difference
between the two NS strategies proposed in (39) and (40),
where the weights are homogeneous.
Example 1. Consider a game described in Section II with
the following numerical parameters: At = 1, Bt = 1,
A¯t = 0, B¯t = 0, Qt = 1, Sxt = −0.5, Q¯t = 5, Rt = 5,
Sut = R¯t = G
x
t = G
u
t = 0, µx = 10, AC(x
i
1) = 2,
AC(wit) = 1 and T = 50 for every t ∈ NT and i ∈ Nn,
where the probability distributions of the initial states and local
noises are i.i.d. and Gaussian. It is shown in Figure 3 that the
finite-population NS strategy proposed in (39), which takes the
number of players into account, converges to the sub-game
perfect Nash solution faster than the infinite-population NS
strategy proposed in (40), as n→∞.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied a class of collaborative and non-
collaborative linear quadratic games for three different types
of weights under three different information structures, and
obtained exact and approximate sequential equilibria by deriv-
ing a novel non-standard Riccati equation. The key idea was
to use a gauge transformation to induce some orthogonality
and linear dependence among variables in order to arrive at a
low-dimensional solution. In addition, we established several
convergence results and characterized the role of the number
of players in collaborative and non-collaborative games with
homogeneous weights. We generalized our main results to
the discounted infinite-horizon cost function and investigated
two special cases wherein the non-standard Riccati equation
reduces to two decoupled standard Riccati equations.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From (4), the dynamics of players i and j may be expanded
as follows:
xit+1 =a
i,i
t x
i
t + a
i,j
t x
j
t + b
i,i
t u
i
t + b
i,j
t u
j
t
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
ai,kt x
k
t +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
bi,kt u
k
t + w
i
t, (57)
and
xjt+1 =a
j,j
t x
j
t + a
j,i
t x
i
t + b
j,j
t u
j
t + b
j,i
t u
i
t
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
aj,kt x
k
t +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
bj,kt u
k
t + w
j
t . (58)
Exchange (xit, u
i
t, w
i
t) with (x
j
t , u
j
t , w
j
t ) in the above equations
and get
xjt+1 =a
i,i
t x
j
t + a
i,j
t x
i
t + b
i,i
t u
j
t + b
i,j
t u
i
t
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
ai,kt x
k
t +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
bi,kt u
k
t + w
j
t , (59)
and
xit+1 =a
j,j
t x
i
t + a
j,i
t x
j
t + b
j,j
t u
i
t + b
j,i
t u
j
t
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
aj,kt x
k
t +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
bj,kt u
k
t + w
i
t. (60)
From Definition 2, (57) and (58) must be equal to (60) and
(59), respectively. Hence, for every i, j ∈ Nn, we get
ai,it = a
j,j
t =: a˜t, a
i,j
t = a
j,i
t =: d˜t,
bi,it = b
j,j
t =: b˜t, b
i,j
t = b
j,i
t =: e˜t.
Consequently, the dynamics of player i ∈ Nn may be re-
written in the form of (2) where
At :=a˜t − d˜t, Bt :=b˜t − e˜t,
A¯t :=nd˜t, B¯t :=ne˜t.
Now, consider the first part of cit, i.e. xt
ᵀQitxt, and expand it
as follows:
xt
ᵀQitxt =x
i
t
ᵀ
qi,it x
i
t +
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
xit
ᵀ
(qi,kt + (q
k,i
t )
ᵀ)xkt
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
xkt
ᵀ
qk,kt x
k
t
+
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
( n∑
k′=1,k′ 6=i,k
xkt
ᵀ
(qk,k
′
t + (q
k′,k
t )
ᵀ)xk
′
t
)
.
(61)
According to Definition 2, exchanging any two arbitrary
players k, k′ 6= i must not change cit. Then, we have
s˜it := q
i,k
t + (q
k,i
t )
ᵀ, q˜it := q
k,k
t = q
k′,k′
t , sˆ
i
t := q
k,k′
t + (q
k,k′
t )
ᵀ.
(62)
Given (62), re-arrange (61) as follows:
xt
ᵀQitxt = x
i
t
ᵀ
qi,it x
i
t +
(
n∑
k=1
xit
ᵀ
s˜itx
k
t
)
− xit
ᵀ
s˜itx
i
t
+
(
n∑
k=1
xkt
ᵀ
q˜itx
k
t
)
− xit
ᵀ
q˜itx
i
t
+
n∑
k=1
n∑
k′=1
xkt
ᵀ
sˆitx
k′
t −
n∑
k=1
xkt
ᵀ
sˆitx
k
t −
n∑
k=1
xkt
ᵀ
sˆitx
i
t
−
n∑
k′=1
xit
ᵀ
sˆitx
k′
t + 2x
i
t
ᵀ
sˆitx
i
t. (63)
Define
qit :=q
i,i
t − s˜it − q˜it + 2sˆit, sx,it :=n(s˜it − 2sˆit),
px,it :=n
2sˆit, g
x,i
t :=q˜
i
t − sˆit.
Then, (63) can be written as
xt
ᵀQitxt = x
i
t
ᵀ
qitx
i
t + x
i
t
ᵀ
sx,it x¯t + x¯
ᵀ
t p
x,i
t x¯t +
n∑
k=1
xkt
ᵀ
gx,it x
k
t .
(64)
From Definition 2, exchanging any two arbitrary players i
and j must exchange cit and c
j
t . Hence, it results from (64)
that
Qt :=q
i
t = q
j
t , 2S
x
t :=s
x,i
t = s
x,j
t ,
Q¯t :=p
x,i
t = p
x,j
t ,
1
n
Gxt :=g
x,i
t = g
x,j
t .
Similar argument holds for utRitut.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From Definition 8, J in(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n )−J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in ), ∀i ∈ Nn,
converges to zero, almost surely, because the dynamics (2),
cost functions (3), and strategies (35) and (39) are continuous
and uniformly bounded in n due to Assumptions 1 and 7, upon
noting that at any time t ∈ NT , the deep state x¯t in (8) under
strategy g∗n, the prediction z
n
t in (36), and the deep state ˆ¯xt
under strategy (39) converge to the same limit given by z∞t
in (37) under strategy g∗∞, according to the strong law of large
numbers under Assumption 6. In particular, J in(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n ) and
J in(g
∗,i
n ,g
∗,−i
n ) can be described by polynomial regressions
in terms of µx, AC(xi1) and AC(w
i
t), t ∈ NT , because:
(a) the state dynamics are linear under strategies gˆn and
g∗n; (b) local noises are zero-mean; (c) per-step cost (3) is
a quadratic function of the states under strategies gˆn and
g∗n, and (d) the initial states as well as local noises are
independent, meaning that AC(x¯1) = 1n2
∑n
i=1 AC(x
i
1) and
AC(w¯t) =
1
n2
∑n
i=1 AC(w
i
t). Therefore, J
i
n(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n ) and
J in(g
∗,i
n ,g
∗,−i
n ) are bounded and continuous with respect to
n since the resultant weighting matrices as well as auto-
covariance matrices are all bounded and continuous with
respect to n, in view of Assumptions 1 and 6. Due to the strong
law of large numbers, gˆn converges to g∗n, almost surely;
hence, J in(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n ) and J
i
n(g
∗,i
n ,g
∗,−i
n ) have the same limit,
which is J i∞(gˆ
i
∞, gˆ
−i
∞ ) = J
i
∞(g
∗,i
∞ ,g
∗,−i
∞ ). A similar argument
holds for J in(gˆ
i
∞, gˆ
−i
∞ )− J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in ), ∀i ∈ Nn.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Suppose player i ∈ Nn plays strategy gi ∈ GNS. Let yjt and
vjt denote, respectively, the state and action of player j ∈ Nn at
time t ∈ NT under the joint strategy {gi,g∗,−in }. Similarly, let
yˆjt and vˆ
j
t denote the state and action of player j ∈ Nn under
the joint strategy {gi, gˆ−in }. From (3) and (6), one can write
J in(g
i,g∗,−in ) as a summation of quadratic terms (continuous
functions) of local states {yjt }nj=1 and local actions {vjt }nj=1
over the game horizon T . Analogously, one can express
J in(g
i, gˆ−in ) as a summation of quadratic terms of local states
{yˆjt }nj=1 and local actions {vˆjt }nj=1. In what follows, we show
that for every strategy gi ∈ GNS under Assumption 8, the set
{yjt , vjt }nj=1 converges to the set {yˆjt , vˆjt }nj=1, almost surely,
as n→∞. Due to the fact that the cost function is uniformly
bounded and continuous with respect to n under Assumption 3,
and continuous in local states and local actions, the gap
∆JR(g
i, gˆn,g
∗
n) = J
i
n(g
i, gˆ−in )− J in(gi,g∗,−in ) converges to
zero, as n→∞. In particular, for every j ∈ Nn, one has:
yjt+1 = Aty
j
t +Btv
j
t + A¯ty¯t + B¯tv¯t + w
j
t ,
yˆjt+1 = Atyˆ
j
t +Btvˆ
j
t + A¯t ˆ¯yt + B¯t ˆ¯vt + w
j
t ,
where
vit = g
i
t(y
i
1:t), v
j
t = θ
n
t y
j
t + (θ¯
n
t − θnt )y¯t, j 6= i,
vˆit = g
i
t(yˆ
i
1:t), vˆ
j
t = θ
n
t yˆ
j
t + (θ¯
n
t − θnt )znt , j 6= i.
In addition,
y¯t+1 = (At + A¯t)y¯t + (Bt + B¯t)v¯t + w¯t, (65)
ˆ¯yt+1 = (At + A¯t)ˆ¯yt + (Bt + B¯t)ˆ¯vt + w¯t, (66)
where
v¯t = α
i
n
(
git(y
i
1:t)− θnt yit − (θ¯nt − θnt )y¯t
)
+ θ¯nt y¯t,
ˆ¯vt = α
i
n
(
git(yˆ
i
1:t)− θnt yˆit − (θ¯nt − θnt )znt
)
+ θ¯nt z
n
t + θ
n
t (ˆ¯yt − znt ).
From Assumptions 3 and 7, strategy (35) is uniformly bounded
and continuous in n. In this case, as n grows to infinity, w¯t
converges to zero due to the strong law of large numbers and
Assumption 6. On the other hand, limn→∞ αin = 0; hence,
one can inductively show that y¯t in (65), ˆ¯yt in (66), and znt
in (36) converge to the same limit, given by (37), almost surely.
In addition, it can be shown that git(y
i
1:t) = g
i
t(yˆ
i
1:t), almost
surely, under Assumption 8.II as n → ∞, and git(yi1:t) =
git(yˆ
i
1:t) under Assumption 8.I everywhere for any arbitrary
n. Consequently, all local states and local actions under the
above two different joint strategies converge to the same limit,
as n→∞, irrespective of the strategy gi. A similar argument
holds for gˆ∞, where the actions under gˆ∞ are given by: vˆ
j
t =
θ∞t yˆ
j
t +(θ¯
∞
t −θ∞t )z∞t , j 6= i, and ˆ¯vt = αin
(
git(yˆ
i
1:t)−θ∞t yˆit−
(θ¯∞t − θ∞t )z∞t
)
+ θ¯∞t z
∞
t + θ
∞
t (ˆ¯yt − z∞t ).
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The proof follows from an induction. Initially, ∆xi1 = x
i
1−
x¯1 = xˆ
i
1 − ˆ¯x1 = ∆xˆi1 and ∆ui1 = θn1 ∆xi1 = θn1 ∆xˆi1 = ∆uˆi1.
Suppose ∆xit = ∆xˆ
i
t and ∆u
i
t = ∆uˆ
i
t at time t. Then, it results
from (2) and (38) that: ∆xit+1 = At∆x
i
t + Bt∆u
i
t + ∆w
i
t =
At∆xˆ
i
t + Bt∆uˆ
i
t + ∆w
i
t = ∆xˆ
i
t+1. In addition, one arrives
at: ∆uit+1 = θ
n
t+1∆x
i
t+1 = θ
n
t+1∆xˆ
i
t+1 = ∆uˆ
i
t+1. According
to (8), (19), (38), (39) and (41), the proof is completed for
SAPDE in (39). For SWMFE in (40), a similar argument holds
for A˜∞t in the finite-population game.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
From Definition 8and equation (6), one has:
∆J iP = E[
T∑
t=t0
[
∆xˆit
ˆ¯xt
]ᵀQt[
∆xˆit
ˆ¯xt
] + [
∆uˆit
ˆ¯ut
]ᵀRt[
∆uˆit
ˆ¯ut
]
+
1
n
(
∑
j 6=i
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ᵀGxt (∆xˆ
j
t )−
1
n− 1(∆xˆ
i
t)
ᵀGxt (∆xˆ
i
t))
+
1
n
(
∑
j 6=i
(∆uˆjt )
ᵀGut (∆uˆ
j
t )−
1
n− 1(∆uˆ
i
t)
ᵀGut (∆uˆ
i
t))
− [ ∆x
i
t
x¯t
]ᵀQt[
∆xit
x¯t
]− [ ∆u
i
t
u¯t
]ᵀRt[
∆uit
u¯t
]
− 1
n
(
∑
j 6=i
(∆xjt )
ᵀGxt (∆x
j
t )−
1
n− 1(∆x
i
t)
ᵀGxt (∆x
i
t))
− 1
n
(
∑
j 6=i
(∆ujt )
ᵀGut (∆u
j
t )−
1
n− 1(∆u
i
t)
ᵀGut (∆u
i
t))]
(a)
= E[
T∑
t=t0
[
eit
et + zt
]ᵀ
Qt
[
eit
et + zt
]
−
[
eit
ζt + zt
]ᵀ
Qt
[
eit
ζt + zt
]
+
[
θte
i
t
θtet + θ¯tzt
]ᵀ
Rt
[
θte
i
t
θtet + θ¯tzt
]
−
[
θte
i
t
θ¯tζt + θ¯tzt
]ᵀ
Rt
[
θeit
θ¯tζt + θ¯tzt
]
(b)
=E[
T∑
t=1
[
eit
et
]ᵀ
Qt
[
eit
et
]
−
[
eit
ζt
]ᵀ
Qt
[
eit
ζt
]
+
[
θte
i
t
θtet
]ᵀ
Rt
[
θte
i
t
θtet
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−
[
θte
i
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Rt
[
θte
i
t
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],
where (a) follows from Lemma 3 and equations (19), (39)
and (41), and (b) is a consequence of E[et] = E[ζt] = 0dx×1,
on noting that zt is deterministic. The proof is now complete
from the definition of Q˜t.
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Prior to the proof, we establish the following useful lemma.
Lemma 5. At any time t ∈ NT , M˜nt
1,1
= 0dx×dx .
Proof. From Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, it follows that
Lemma 5 holds at the terminal time, i.e. M˜nT
1,1
= Q˜nT
1,1
=
0dx×dx . It can be inductively shown that Lemma 5 holds at
time t ∈ NT−1, according to equation (44) and Lemma 4, i.e.
M˜nt
1,1
= (A˜nt
1,1
)ᵀM˜nt+1
1,1
A˜nt
1,1
+ Q˜nt
1,1
= 0dx×dx . 
From Assumption 6, one has: AC(x¯1) =
1
n2
∑n
i=1 AC(x
i
1) ≤ 1nCx,AC(w¯t) = 1n2
∑n
i=1 AC(w
i
t) ≤
1
nCw, where Cx and Cw are some upper bounds on the
auto-covariance matrices of the initial states and local noises
(that do not depend on n). In addition, for any i ∈ Nn,
E[(xi1− x¯1)x¯ᵀ1 ] = E[xi1x¯ᵀ1 ]−E[x¯1x¯ᵀ1 ] = 1n AC(xi1)−AC(x¯1).
Similarly, E[(wit − w¯t)w¯ᵀt ] = 1n AC(wit) − AC(w¯t) at any
t ∈ NT . Consequently, all block matrices of the matrices Hxt0
and Hwt , except the ones in the first row and first column,
decay to zero at the rate 1/n. On the other hand, the block
matrices in the first row and first column of matrices Hxt0
and Hwt have no effect on ∆J
i
P (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 , according to
equation (43) and Lemma 5. Consequently, one can conclude
that ∆J iP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 , i ∈ Nn, described in Definition 8,
converges to zero at the rate 1/n because matrices M˜nt0:T
are uniformly bounded with respect to n according to
Assumption 1, Lemmas 3 and 4 and equation (44). Thus,
NS strategy (39) is SARE according to Definition 4, where
εt0(n) := ∆JP (gˆn,g
∗
n)t0 converges to zero at the rate 1/n.
Suppose Assumption 8 holds. From Theorem 1, the follow-
ing inequality holds for any gi ∈ GNS,
J in(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n )t0 = J
i
n(gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n )t0 ± J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in )t0
≤ J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in )t0 + ∆JP (gˆn,g∗n)t0
≤ J in(gi,g∗,−in )t0 + ∆JP (gˆn,g∗n)± J in(gi, gˆ−in )t0
≤ J in(gi, gˆ−in )t0 + ∆JP (gˆn,g∗n) + ∆JR(gˆn,g∗n)t0 ,
where ∆JP (gˆn,g∗n)t0 converges to zero according to (45),
and ∆JR(gˆn,g∗n)t0 converges to zero according to Lemma 2.
The proof is now completed from Definition 5.
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From Definitions 4 and 8, let εt0(n) =
maxi∈Nn |J in(gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ )t0 − J in(g∗,in ,g∗,−in )t0 |. It is shown
in Lemma 1 that the above performance gap converges to
zero as n → ∞ under Assumption 7. Since Assumption 3
satisfies Assumption 7 for homogeneous weights, according
to Corollary 4, the proof of the first part follows accordingly.
To prove the second part, one can use Lemmas 1 and 2 in
a similar way proposed in Theorem 3 to establish the con-
vergence result under Assumption 7; however, this approach
comes at a price that the finite-population solution must exist.
The beauty of the asymptotic Nash equilibrium is that it does
not need such an assumption, and one can still establish the
convergence result without Assumption 7 by replacing the
finite-population solution with the infinite-population one. In
particular, from the triangle inequality, one has the following
for every n ≥ n0 and gi ∈ GNS ⊆ GPS:
J in(gˆ
i
∞, gˆ
−i
∞ )t0 = J
i
n(gˆ
i
∞, gˆ
−i
∞ )t0 ± J in(g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ )t0
≤ J in(g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ )t0 + max
i∈Nn
|J in(gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ )t0 − J in(g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |
(a)
≤ J
i
n(g
i,g∗,−i∞ )t0 + max
i∈Nn
|J i∞(gi,g∗,−i∞ )t0 − J in(gi,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |
+ max
i∈Nn
|J in(gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ )t0 − J in(g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |J in(gi, gˆ−i∞ )t0
(b)
≤ J
i
n(g
i, gˆ−i∞ )t0 + ε¯t0(n),
where (a) follows from Theorem 1 and the triangle inequality,
and (b) follows from
ε¯t0(n) := max
i∈Nn
|J i∞(gi,g∗,−i∞ )t0 − J in(gi,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |
+ max
i∈Nn
|J in(gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ )t0 − J in(g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |
+ sup
gi
|J in(gi, gˆ−i∞ )t0 − J in(gi,g∗,−i∞ )t0 |. (67)
The first term of the right-hand side of inequality (67)
converges to zero because J in(g
i,g∗,−i∞ )t0 is continuous and
uniformly bounded in n under population-size-independent
model condition. The second term of the right-hand side of
inequality (67) is zero, almost surely, because gˆ∞ in (40) is
equal to g∗∞ in (20) with probability one, due to the strong law
of large numbers, Assumption 6, and Definition 7. The third
term of the right-hand side of inequality (67) can be shown to
converge to zero as n→∞ as well, where the proof follows
the same steps as those of the proof of Lemma 2, where gˆn
and g∗n are replaced by gˆ∞ and g
∗
∞, respectively.
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The proof follows from the notion of εT -perfect equilibrium
of a truncated game by horizon (stage) T , where as T →∞,
εT → 0. In particular, given a discounted cost repeated game,
it is shown in [50, Theorem 3.3] that the finite-horizon solution
converges to the infinite-horizon one, as T → ∞, i.e., εT -
perfect equilibrium converges to an equilibrium in the infinite
horizon. To avoid repetition, we only show herein that the
finite-horizon solution (which is proved in Theorem 1 to be the
sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium) converges to the infinite-
horizon solution, and refer the interested reader to a procedure
described in [50] for constructing a sequence of εT -perfect
strategies that converge to the infinite-horizon limit.
For any game with finite horizon T , fix the strategies of all
players but player i. From the proof of Theorem 1, the best
response strategy of player i ∈ Nn can be identified by the
following dynamic program (22) for player i ∈ Nn at time
t ∈ NT , i.e.,
V it (x˜t) = (1−γ) min
uit
(E[γt−1ci(x˜t, u˜t)+V it+1(x˜t+1) | x˜t, u˜t]).
(68)
Define the non-standard Riccati equation for any α ∈ An:
Pαt =γ
t−1(Qα+(θαt )
ᵀRαθαt )+(A+Bθ
α
t )
ᵀPαt+1(A+Bθ
α
t ),
where PαT+1 = 02dx×2dx , and θ
α
t =: diag(θt(α), θ¯t(α)),
θt(α) and θ¯t(α) are described by:
θt(α) := (Ft(α))
−1Kt(α), θ¯αt := (F¯t(α))
−1K¯t(α),
Ft(α) := (1− α)
[
γt−1(R+
α
1− αG
u) +BᵀPαt+1
1,1B
]
+ α
[
γt−1(R+ Su) + (B + B¯)ᵀPαt+1
1,2B
]
,
F¯t(α) := (1− α)
[
γt−1(R+ Su) +BᵀPαt+1
2,1(B + B¯)
]
+ α
[
γt−1(R+ 2Su + R¯+Gu) + (B + B¯)ᵀPαt+1
2,2(B + B¯)
]
,
Kt(α) := −(1− α)
[
BᵀPαt+1
1,1A
]
− α
[
(B + B¯)ᵀPαt+1
1,2A
]
,
K¯t(α) := −(1− α)
[
BᵀPαt+1
2,1(A+ A¯)
]
− α
[
(B + B¯)ᵀPαt+1
2,2(A+ A¯)
]
. (69)
Furthermore, define Pαt := γ
t−1(Gx + (θαt )
ᵀGuθαt ) + (A −
Bθαt )P
α
t+1(A−Bθαt ). Hence, one arrives at:
V it (x˜t) = (1− γ)
( [∆xit
x¯t
]ᵀ
P
αin
t
[
∆xit
x¯t
]
+ `it
+
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t )
ᵀPα
i
n
t (∆x
j
t )−
(αin)
2
1− αin
(∆xit)
ᵀPα
i
n
t (∆x
i
t)
)
.
(70)
where `it := `
i
t+1 + Tr
(
AC(vec(∆wit, w¯t))P
αin
t+1
)
+∑n
j=1α
j
n Tr
(
AC(∆wjt )P
αin
t+1
) − αin Tr(AC(∆wit)Pαint+1)1−αin . Denote
by Σ¯j = AC(vec(∆wjt , w¯t)) and Σ
i = AC(∆wjt ), t ∈ NT ,
the time-homogeneous auto-covariance matrices associated
with any player j ∈ Nn.
Let W it (x˜) := γ
−t′−1V it′+2(x˜) for every i ∈ Nn, where
t′ := T − t, t ∈ NT+1. Let also Φαt := γ−t
′−1Pαt′+2 and
Φαt := γ
−t′−1Pαt′+2, α ∈ An. From (68) and (70), one arrives
at the following equation:
W it+1(x˜t′+1) = (1− γ) min
ui
t′+1
(E[ci(x˜t′+1, u˜t′+1)
+ γW it (x˜t′+2) | x˜t′+1, u˜t′+1]), (71)
where
W it+1(x˜t′+1) = (1− γ)γ−t
′( [∆xit′+1
x¯t′+1
]ᵀ
Φ
αin
t+1
[
∆xit′+1
x¯t′+1
]
+ ˜`it+1 +
∑
j 6=i
αjn(∆x
j
t′+1)
ᵀΦα
i
n
t+1(∆x
j
t′+1)
− (α
i
n)
2
1− αin
(∆xit′+1)
ᵀΦα
i
n
t+1(∆x
i
t′+1)
)
,
and ˜`it+1 := ˜`
i
t + γ
(
Tr(Σ¯iΦ
αin
t ) +
∑n
j=1α
j
n Tr(Σ
jΦ
αin
t+1) −
αin Tr(Σ
iΦ
αin
t+1)
1−αin
)
. Subsequently, the control laws in (69) can be
expressed as follows:
θt′(α) := (Ft′)
−1Kt′ , θ¯αt′ := (F¯t′)
−1K¯t′ ,
Ft′(α) := (1− α)
[
R+
α
1− αG
u + γ−t
′+1BᵀΦαt+1
1,1B
]
+ α
[
R+ Su + γ−t
′+1(B + B¯)ᵀΦαt+1
1,2B
]
,
F¯t′(α) = (1− α)
[
R+ Su + γ−t
′+1BᵀΦαt+1
2,1(B + B¯)
]
+ α
[
R+ 2Su + R¯+Gu + γ−t
′+1(B + B¯)ᵀΦαt+1
2,2(B + B¯)
]
,
Kt′(α) = −(1− α)γ−t′+1(BᵀΦαt+11,1A)
− αγ−t′+1((B + B¯)ᵀΦαt+11,2A)),
K¯t′(α) := −(1− α)γ−t′+1(BᵀΦαt+12,1(A+ A¯))
− αγ−t′+1((B + B¯)ᵀΦαt+12,2(A+ A¯)). (72)
Due to the uniformly bounded assumption imposed on the
admissible actions in Section II and the fact that the discount
factor is less than one, it is well-known that the Bellman
equation (71) is a contractive mapping and admits a unique
solution. In particular, with a slight abuse of notation, one has:
W i∞(x˜t′)=(1−γ)min
ui
t′
(E[ci(x˜t′ ,u˜t′)+γW
i
∞(x˜t′+1)|x˜t′ ,u˜t′ ]),
where under Assumption 9 and for any α ∈ An,
lim
T→∞
γ−t
′
Φαt+1= lim
T→∞
γ−T+tΦαt+1= lim
T→∞
PT−t+1=Pα,
(73)
lim
T→∞
γ−t
′
Φαt+1= lim
T→∞
γ−T+tΦαt+1= lim
T→∞
PαT−t+1=P
α. (74)
Therefore, from (72), (73) and (74), one can conclude that the
terms on the right hand-side of (72) are time-homogeneous,
as T → ∞, i.e., stationary strategies (51), (52) and (53) are
the limit of their finite-horizon counterparts.
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From equations (8), (51) and (36), x¯t+1 and znt+1 have
the same dynamics (except the drift terms) under strategies
{g∗,in ,g∗,−in } and {gˆin, gˆ−in }, respectively, implying that tra-
jectory zn1:∞ is bounded because trajectory x¯1:∞ is bounded
under Assumption 9 according to Theorem 6. On the other
hand, the relative errors in Lemma 3 are also bounded because
matrix A˜n is Hurwitz. Therefore, trajectory ˆ¯x1:∞ should
be bounded, which means ˆ¯u1:∞ is also bounded, according
to (39). Consequently, the infinite-horizon discounted cost
function J i,γn (gˆ
i
n, gˆ
−i
n ) is bounded. A similar argument holds
for {g∗,i∞ ,g∗,−i∞ } and {gˆi∞, gˆ−i∞ }.
